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Preface 
 
 
This report has been commissioned by Norsk Hydro ASA and written in the period February to May 
2001. The aim of the report is to give an overview of the state of climate research and international 
climate policy negotiations until May 2001. The report presents a collection of factual information 
based on reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), various reports from 
CICERO, and a number of other sources compiled by the CICERO team of authors. This is an updated 
version of a similar report that was produced for Norsk Hydro ASA in March 1997 (CICERO Report 
1997:5). The report is organized as a collection of slides with comments that explain the background, 
the contents of each slide, and their relation to other aspects of climate research and policy. 
 
We hope that this report will provide a useful overview of climate change issues for everyone that is 
interested in what happens to our global climate. We thank Jan Fuglestvedt for valuable comments, 
and Lynn Nygaard and Tone Veiby for excellent language and editing assistance. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this report is to give an overview of the state of the science of climate change research and 
the state of the international climate policy negotiations. The report is an updated version of CICERO 
Report 1997:05. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997, but has not yet entered into force since not 
enough countries have ratified the Protocol. Even if the future of the Kyoto Protocol is more uncertain 
than ever, a number of countries have made preparations to implement the Protocol, in particular 
through initiatives to establish national and regional emission trading systems. A Summary for 
Policymakers of the third assessment report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was released in the spring of 2001.1 The full reports are scheduled for release later this year. In 
the area of regional climate change impacts, a number of research projects have contributed new 
insights, not the least the research project RegClim in Norway.  
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the climate system and the climate history of the Earth. The main 
message is that indications of a man-made global warming are stronger than ever before, and also that 
the warming trend has been particularly notable over the last decade. The next chapter presents the 
newest scenarios for global man-made greenhouse gas emissions, followed by an analysis of necessary 
emission reductions to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The scenarios show 
the large span between low-emission futures and high-emission futures, and how the specific 
outcomes depend on the major driving forces. Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases under a doubling of pre-industrial concentrations would require global emission 
reductions in the region of 70% over some decades. Based on these scenarios, the newest IPCC 
estimates of future climate trends are given, after which future climate trends for Norway based on the 
RegClim project are presented. The upper estimate of global temperature increase is higher than 
earlier (5.8 oC) because of lower projected sulfur emissions (cooling effect). The RegClim results 
predict a warmer and wetter future for Norway. The range of climate change impacts and adaptation is 
the topic of chapter 4, first at the global level and then at the national level in Norway. Climate change 
impacts are not likely to be dramatic at the global level, but there can be substantial differences 
between regions and various human activities. Some impacts are likely to be beneficial, but others 
could be significantly negative for vulnerable regions, in particular for some developing countries with 
little capacity to adapt to climate change. Moving onto the policy arena in chapter 5, we briefly 
describe the climate policy negotiations from the Climate Convention from 1992 until the Kyoto 
Protocol from 1997, and the negotiations from 1998 onwards to fill in the missing details of the 
Protocol.2 In the next section we focus on the status of the negotiations after the failure of the sixth 
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP6) in The Hague in November 2000, and 
emphasize the land use change and forestry issues and rules for the Kyoto mechanisms that turned out 
to be the crunch issues. In chapter 6 we include an overview of important Parties’ negotiation 
positions after the conference in The Hague, and link this to a presentation of structural features within 
countries that explain different emission levels and abatement costs and how they affect national 
positions. Another important determining factor for a country’s position is its anticipation of and 
concern about future costs related to climate change impacts. The next section presents some results 
from analyses of how implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will affect the markets for fossil fuels, 
which is of particular interest for Norway as a large oil- and gas-exporter. For Norway, the costs 
resulting from reduced oil and gas wealth are greater than the sum of emission abatement costs and 
projected expenses from purchasing emission quotas in other countries. In chapter 7, the main features 
of some initiatives for domestic and regional emission trading systems, policies and measures within 
the EU to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and green certificates to stimulate renewable energy 
sources are described. Furthermore a discussion of important challenges for Norwegian climate policy 
                                                     
1
 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) set up 
IPCC jointly in 1988. 
2
 The official name of the Climate Convention is United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). 
 10 
is offered, showing Norway’s dependency on the Kyoto mechanisms. Finally, in chapter 8 we analyze 
the prospects for the climate policy negotiations and the Kyoto Protocol, focusing on the setback of 
the negotiations after the USA’s pronounced skepticism to the Kyoto Protocol, and look into burden 
sharing aspects of future climate policy agreements. Given the large differences in national 
circumstances and income levels among the countries of the world, future negotiations face substantial 
challenges with respect to designing agreements that balance both efficiency and fairness 
considerations. 
 
2. The climate system and climate history of the 
Earth 
2.1 The climate system  
The climate in a given region is determined by the probability distribution (the average and the 
variability) of the weather. Key parameters include average values of temperature, precipitation and 
wind, as well as extreme values of these and other parameters.   
 
Slide 2.1. Climate change: Driving forces 
Climate change: Driving forces
Source: IPCC (2001a)
 
 
 
The climate of the Earth is produced by the interaction between a large number of sub-systems, of 
which the most important are the atmosphere, the oceans, the cryosphere (ice and snow), the 
biosphere, and the lithosphere (rock and soil). Energy and matter are exchanged between these 
systems, causing chemical reactions to take place and thus altering the composition of the sub-
systems. These processes operate on a number of time scales, from the very slowest geological time 
scales to more short-term changes due to bio-physical processes. The non-linear interactions within 
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and between the sub-systems make it very difficult to predict the climatic effects of changes in one or 
more of the driving forces of the climate system.  
 
The driving forces are partly external to the climate system and partly internal. Strictly external 
driving forces behind the climate system include solar output, variations in the orbit of the Earth and 
geological processes such as continental drift and volcanic activity. Effects from the forces are 
enhanced or diminished through internal feedback processes related to weathering of rock, changes in 
ocean currents and the albedo of the Earth’s surface, biological changes on the surface of the Earth, 
and the atmosphere. Human impacts work particularly through these last two mechanisms: changes in 
the atmosphere and land use changes. 
 
 
Slide 2.2. Climate change: Driving forces on many time scales 
Climate change: Driving forces
on many time scales
External forces:
! Variations in solar output (all time scales)
! Variations in the orbit of the Earth (relatively slow)
! The form and positions of the continents (slow)
! Vulcanic activity (all time scales)
Internal forces and feedbacks:
! Changes in the Earth’s albedo (all time scales)
! Changes in the Earth’s biosphere (all time scales)
! Changes in the composition of the atmosphere:
• gases (fast and relatively slow)
• particles (fast)
• clouds (fast)
Source: IPCC (2001a) and CICERO
 
 
The so-called greenhouse effect, i.e. the trapping of heat from the Earth by radiative active gases in the 
atmosphere, has been operating on Earth since the atmosphere was first formed.  The natural 
greenhouse effect – caused by the presence of water, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere – leads to a 34 oC higher average temperature on Earth than otherwise would have been 
the case. Life on Earth as we know it thus depends on the operation of the greenhouse effect. 
However, since the industrial revolution mankind has enhanced the concentration of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere –carbon dioxide in particular. The increase has been very rapid and is leading to the 
enhanced greenhouse effect.  
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Slide 2.3. Radiative balance 
 
Radiative balance
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surface
Reflected 
sunlight
Absorbed by the 
atmosphere
Heat transport
Evaporation Heat radiation 
from surface
Latent heat
Incoming
sunlight
Absorbed by 
the surface
Reflected from clouds, 
areosols and gases
Outgoing 
heat radiation
Atmospheric 
window
Greenhouse gases
Absorbed by 
the surface
Heat radiation
from the atmosphere
Radiation from
the atmosphere
Source: NILU
 
 
Changes in land use affect the carbon cycle through changes in vegetation respiration and storage of 
carbon in soils, as well as the albedo of the Earth, thus altering the amount of solar radiation reflected 
back into space. Changes in the composition of the atmosphere lead to changes in the greenhouse 
effect. This effect works by letting short-wave radiation from the sun through the atmosphere but 
inhibits the long-wave heat radiation from the Earth. For a stable surface temperature, the energy 
received through short-wave solar radiation must balance the outgoing long-wave heat radiation. An 
increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere must therefore be balanced by an 
increased surface temperature.  
 
The most important greenhouse gases include water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and ozone (O3). The enhanced greenhouse effect – caused by increased 
emissions of CO2, CH4, and N2O, and by emissions of new chemicals such as the PFC and HFC gases 
since the industrial revolution some 200 years ago – leads to an increase in the natural greenhouse 
warming and may induce man-made climate change. 
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Slide 2.4. Climate change and the sun: How important? 
Climate change and the sun: 
How important?
Source: NASA
 
 
Among the important driving forces for climate change are solar variations. The sun is probably more 
active now than it was 250 years ago. The total increase in solar irradiance is of 0.2–0.5%. This 
increase has contributed to the surface warming of the Earth, but not as much as the growth in 
greenhouse gas concentrations.  
 
The ultraviolet radiation from the sun has perhaps increased by 3% over the same period. This may 
have an indirect effect on the climate through changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere, and ozone 
generation in particular.  
 
Long-term variations in the solar wind and interplanetary magnetic field can have an indirect effect on 
the climate through the influence of the magnetic field on cosmic rays reaching the atmosphere. A 
stronger magnetic field will shield the atmosphere from some of the cosmic rays that otherwise would 
have reached the atmosphere of the Earth. The rays can in turn have an effect on the cloud formation, 
and through this have a climatic effect. Some studies indicate that the solar magnetic field has 
increased by 230% since 1901 and 40% since 1964. The physical mechanisms and the potential 
importance of this indirect effect of changes in solar output remain to be fully explored. The current 
status is summarized by the IPCC as follows: “Mechanisms for the amplification of solar effects on 
climate have been proposed, but currently lack a rigorous theoretical or observational basis” (IPCC, 
2001a). 
2.2 Climate history and variations 
We believe the Earth to be approximately 4.6 billion years old. This is a time span that is difficult to 
grasp. Human history represents only a brief moment on this scale, and possible human-induced 
changes in the Earth’s climate appear to be only an insignificant perturbation from this perspective. 
Still, to us it matters. 
 
 14 
Throughout its history, the Earth has experienced huge climate changes. Today, we believe that the 
Earth has gone through four or five “ice houses,” and a similar number of “hot houses.” During the 
“ice house” periods, the Earth has experienced a more or less regular coming and going of ice ages, 
long intervals with a very cold and mostly dry climate punctuated with intermediate periods with 
much less ice. During the “hot house” periods, the climate was warm, much warmer than today, with 
no or very little ice to be found at the Earth’s surface.  
 
Slide 2.5. The Earth’s history 
The Earth’s history
 
 
 
These changes, although large, have still been limited to a range that has allowed life to develop and 
evolve for almost 4 billion years. And this is despite the fact that the external forcing from the sun has 
increased by approximately 30% over the time period. The reason for this successful balance between 
a deeply frozen snowball Earth and a boiling inferno is to be found in the many feedbacks within the 
climate system. 
 
Today, the Earth is in an “ice house” period. 
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Slide 2.6. Climate history: Four or five ice age periods 
Climate history: Four or five ice 
age periods
Source: L.A. Frakes (1979)
 
 
Slide 2.7. Ice ages in the last ice house period (2.5. million years) 
Ice ages in the last ice house 
period (2.5 million years)
Source: Clark et al. (1999)
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The current “ice house” period started approximately 3 million years ago, and the Earth has 
experienced several dozen ice ages since then. It is speculated that this “ice house” was set off when 
South and North America collided and the oceanic currents changed more or less to today’s 
configuration.  
 
In the beginning, the ice ages were rather short and lasted for approximately 40,000 years. Lately, they 
have tended to be colder and to last longer: approximately 100,000 years with rather short intermediate 
periods of some 10 to 20,000 years. The coming and going of the individual ice age is governed by 
small changes in the Earth’s orbits that act as triggers and are amplified by internal feedback in the 
climate system linked to the concentration of greenhouse gases such as CO2 and CH4 in the 
atmosphere. The last ice age ended approximately 10,000 years ago. Normally we would then expect 
to be on the brink of a new ice age. However, fortunate circumstances with respect to changes in the 
orbit of the Earth have produced a longer intermediate period this time. Thus we foresee a period of 40 
to 50,000 years before the next ice age. The issue of anthropogenic climate change is only a short 
episode within this rather long current intermediate period, but still it matters to us. 
 
Slide 2.8. Antarctic temperatures over the last 420,000 years 
Antarctic temperatures over the 
last 420,000 years
Source: Petit et al. (1999)
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Measurements from ice cores drilled at the Russian-French Antarctic research station Vostok allow us 
to get a fairly detailed picture of the temperature development in this region over the last 420,000 
years. What we find is a pattern where the temperature gradually falls during an ice age, then to be 
followed by a rapid rise in temperature, leading to a relatively short intermediate period (interstadial).  
 
History shows us that the climate may vary considerably as a result of natural causes. Slide 2.9 shows 
abrupt climate changes in our region as recorded in Greenland ice-core data. We find changes in 
annual mean temperatures of more than 10 oC over a few decades triggered by rapid change in the 
North Atlantic current. After the end of the last ice age 10,000 years ago, this huge variability has 
disappeared. It is during this much calmer period that we as a species have established our civilization, 
built cities and developed to where we are today. Thus, our civilization has never experienced climate 
variability as it was during the last ice age and before. The potential reoccurrence of this variability is 
an important aspect of the climate problem. There are probably threshold values for the anthropogenic 
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forcing of the climate, which if exceeded, will trigger instabilities in the ocean current, and hence in 
the climate, similar to those observed during the last ice age. 
 
Slide 2.9. Natural variations 
Natural variations
Source: Ganopolski and Rahmstorf (2001)
 
 
 
Slide 2.10. Northern hemisphere temperature variations over the last 1000 years 
Northern hemisphere temperature 
variations over the last 1000 years
Source: Mann et al. (1999)
 
 
The temperature variations over the last 1000 years can be inferred from a number of proxy indicators 
such as tree ring or sedimentation measurements, etc. The picture that emerges for the Northern 
hemisphere depicts a long-term cooling trend (more or less in accordance with what we expect to 
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happen as a result of orbital variations) punctuated by two periods of rapidly increasing temperatures. 
The first period is from approximately 1910 to 1945, and the second period starts in 1976 and is still in 
progress. 
 
Slide 2.11. Global annual temperature variations relative to 1961-1990 
Global annual temperature 
variations relative to 1961–1990
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It is only for the last 150 years that we have a reasonably reliable instrumental record of global 
changes in the average annual temperature variations. Slide 2.11 shows in more detail the annual 
variations and the two warming periods from 1910 to 1945 and from 1976, together with a slight 
cooling period between the end of the first period and the start of the second period. While the 
warming from 1920 to 1945 can be explained by predominantly natural driving forces (solar variation 
and variations in volcanic activity), the effects of emissions of greenhouse gases dominate in the 
period from 1976.  
 
At the beginning of this century, the global mean temperature was some 0.6 oC higher than at the 
beginning of the last century. Year 2000 was the fifth warmest year on record, beaten only by 1999, 
1998, 1997, 1995, and 1990. The ten warmest years have all been since 1983, and eight of them since 
1990. Year 2000 was the twentieth consecutive year with a mean annual temperature above the 1961–
1990 norm.  
 
2.3 Changes in the concentration of greenhouse gases 
The most important driving force behind the recent rapid increase in global temperature is probably 
the enhanced greenhouse effect. The most important greenhouse gases are listed in Slide 2.12. 
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Slide 2.12. Greenhouse gases 
Greenhouse gases
Source: IPCC (1996a)
 
 
Slide 2.13. CO2 concentration in earlier times 
CO2 concentration in earlier times
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Half a billion years ago, the CO2 concentration in the Earth’s atmosphere was probably some 15 times 
higher than today, see panel a of the figure. Then, 300 million years ago, the landscape was changed 
dramatically through plant growth, which reduced the CO2 concentration substantially. Panel b shows 
the CO2 concentration over the last four ice ages, obtained by measurements from ice cores from the 
Antarctic. During this period, the concentration level was between 180 and 280 ppmv. Only during the 
last 100 years has this level been exceeded (panels c and d). Panel b gives a perspective of where we 
are heading the next 100 years in relation to the “normal” background level. 
 
Slide 2.14. The carbon cycle 
The carbon cycle
Source: Grid-Arendal (2001) and IPCC (1996)
 
 
 
The CO2 concentration in the atmosphere is the result of exchanges of carbon between several 
reservoirs. The man-made flux of carbon to the atmosphere is small compared to the natural fluxes 
between the reservoirs, but these are more or less compensated by return flows. Thus, since the 
anthropogenic emission of carbon is a one-way stream, it over time leads to the increased 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, as has already been observed (approximately 30% from a pre-
industrial level).  
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Slide 2.15. CH4 concentration 
CH4 concentration
Source: IPCC (1996)
 
 
Also the concentration of CH4 has increased substantially since the industrial revolution. 
 
2.4 Radiative forcing and Global Warming Potentials 
 
Slide 2.16. Radiative forcing 
Radiative forcing
Source: IPCC (1996a)
 
 
 22 
“Radiative forcing” is a measure of the influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and 
outgoing energy in the Earth–atmosphere system. A positive radiative forcing indicates a trapping of 
energy in the atmosphere and thus has a heating effect.  
 
Changes in the composition of the atmosphere, surface characteristics of the Earth, and solar radiation 
since 1750 have changed the radiation balance of the atmosphere, as shown in Slide 2.16. The slide 
also gives a rough indication of the confidence level associated with the different factors. The 
dominating role of CO2 and other greenhouse gases at the far left of the slide and the relative high 
scientific certainty associated with these warming effects is particularly noteworthy. The greatest 
uncertainty is associated with the indirect effects of aerosols, e.g. their impact on cloud formation and 
the cloud effects on the radiative forcing.  
 
Slide 2.17. Some Global Warming Potentials (GWP) 
Some Global Warming Potentials (GWP)
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By integrating the radiative effect of a unit of a greenhouse gas over a certain time horizon – 
conventionally chosen as 20, 100 or 500 years – it is possible to get a rough measure of the warming 
potential of that gas. It is also the convention to normalize the warming potential such that the 
warming potential of CO2 is equal to one (i.e. all gases are compared to CO2 when assessing their 
warming potentials). The extreme high values of some of the fully fluorinated species and also some 
of the ethers and halogenated ethers are noteworthy in this respect. 
 
2.5 Observed climate change: Is it man-made? 
Observed and inferred changes in mean temperature have been depicted in earlier slides. Slide 2.18 
(left panel) shows a breakdown of temperature changes over land and oceans. As expected, the 
increase has been larger over land areas than over oceans, due to the greater thermal inertia of the 
oceans. In addition to changes in the global mean temperature, we have also observed changes in 
precipitation. 
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Slide 2.18. Temperature and precipitation 
Temperature and precipitation
Source: National Climate Data Center/NESDIS/NOAA
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Slide 2.19. The ocean 
The ocean
Source: Levitus et al. (2000), IPCC (1996), Grid Arendal (2001), Grevemeyer, I., R. Et al. (2000)
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Other observations also indicate that the climate is changing. Thus the ocean temperature down to 
approximately 3000 m has been increasing. The left panel of Slide 2.19 shows observations from the 
Atlantic. As a result of increased temperature, the water mass expands and the sea level increases 
(middle panel). Finally, increased wind has increased the wave heights in the North Atlantic as 
measured directly or as inferred from the measurement of micro-seismic events. 
 
Slide 2.20. NAO and our local climate 
NAO and our local climate
Source: NOAA/NILU-RegClim
 
 
 
Changes in the regional or local level will differ considerably from global changes due to 
topographical features, ocean currents and other local or regional features and processes. In our region, 
we find that the regional climate is strongly coupled to the so-called North Atlantic Oscillation index 
(NAO). The index measures the pressure difference between the Icelandic low pressure and the high-
pressure region near the Azores. A low NAO index during the winter season implies that the low-
pressure systems coming across the Atlantic take a southern course, exposing Norway to cold polar air 
masses. A high NAO index results in a more northern path for the low-pressure systems, with warm 
and moist air dominating over Norway. We see from the slide that during the periods with global 
warming (1910–1945 and 1976–), we tend to have a high NAO index.  
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Slide 2.21. Temperature development in Norway 
Global and Norwegian mean 
temperature 1900-1999
 
 
 
Slide 2.21 shows a comparison between the development in global mean temperature (red curve) and 
the temperature in Norway (blue curve) over the least century relative to the mean value of the period 
1961–1990. 
 
Slide 2.22. Ocean currents 
Ocean currents
Source: GRID Arendal
 
 
We also see changes in ocean processes like the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic. The 
deep-water formation taking place in the North Atlantic has been significantly reduced over the last 
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few decades. This may lead to changes in the ocean currents and in the heat transport that takes place 
because of them. 
 
Previous huge natural climate variations during the last ice age were probably caused by such changes 
in the ocean current. Continued increasing man-made climate change may trigger a new period of 
climatic instability. This is a much more dire scenario than a gradually warming world, and reinforces 
the importance of the Precautionary Principle in the context of climate change. 
 
Slide 2.23. Does human activity have an effect on our climate? 
Does human activity have an 
effect on our climate?
Source: IPCC (2001a)
 
 
 
Are the observed climate changes man-made?  The IPCC concludes that there is new and stronger 
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities. 
Slide 2.23 shows one piece of evidence in the form of three model simulations of global mean 
temperatures over approximately the last 150 years. In the upper left hand panel, natural driving forces 
drive the model simulations only. In the upper right hand panel, only anthropogenic forces 
(greenhouse gases) are included, while the lower panel combines both types of forces. The agreement 
with the observed temperature changes (red curve) is convincing only when anthropogenic forces are 
included. 
2.6 The debate about IPCC 
In the climate debate, scientists tend to be classified into one of two categories: Those who tend to 
accept the findings of IPCC, and those who, for various reasons, are critical to the conclusions of 
IPCC. The criticisms broadly follow two dimensions: (1) a concern about procedural practices in the 
IPCC where the skeptics tend to claim that certain disciplines, and regions are not properly represented 
among the many hundreds of lead authors, contributing authors, or reviewers, and (2) a disagreement 
about the underlying science of climate change. The following section offers comments on each of 
these dimensions. 
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Procedural matters and fair representation 
While there certainly are bound to be some unfortunate omissions or biased selections along some of 
these dimensions, it is still a fact that the IPCC process is by far the most open and all-inclusive 
assessment process undertaken in the scientific community. Over time, the IPCC has also included 
representatives from ever more disciplines as the climate relevant research from these disciplines has 
increased, and efforts are undertaken to include more of the non-English literature in the assessment 
process. All in all, it is difficult to understand the accusation that the IPCC assessment process is a 
highly politicized process, all the more so since some of the critics clearly represent business interests 
themselves (e.g. the Global Climate Coalition). 
Scientific disagreements 
Those who disagree with the IPCC about the science of climate change can in turn be roughly divided 
into two groups. One group criticizes the basic scientific facts and observations, while the other group 
proposes alternative hypotheses concerning one or more less well-known mechanisms at work in the 
climate system. 
 
Among those who are skeptical to basic scientific facts and observations, we find a group of 
individuals who are skeptical to the reliability and representativeness of the temperature measurements 
and the corrections they are subject to due to the use of different measurement instruments, urban heat 
island effects and so on. Others are critical to the methods used for measuring the CO2 content of the 
atmosphere, while some doubt the well-established radiative properties of the greenhouse gases. While 
no scientific fact is foolproof and immune to improvement, it is fair to say that the majority of 
criticisms raised in this category are based on rather simple misunderstandings of the underlying 
physics of climate change. An exception is the criticism based on disagreements between surface 
temperature measurements and measurements carried out by satellites since the late 1970s. While the 
two time series measure two different things (surface temperatures and temperatures in the lower 
troposphere) and the gap between the measurement series has narrowed over time due to corrections 
of the satellite data, it still remains an unexplained difference which gives cause for concern about our 
understanding of the energy transport in the lower troposphere.  
 
The most serious criticism of IPCC comes from those proposing alternative hypotheses about key 
physical mechanisms in the climate system. The mechanisms are related to transport and condensation 
of humidity in the upper troposphere/lower stratosphere under climate change, hypotheses about the 
indirect effects of solar activity on the flux of cosmic rays and cloud formation, and concern about our 
ability to model ocean currents in a realistic manner. The IPCC explicitly acknowledges that we lack 
an understanding of these mechanisms, and there is no disagreement about the need to research these 
areas further. Still, the IPCC does not advocate that we should disregard what we know about the 
effect of greenhouse gases on climate development in view of the uncertainties with regard to the 
mentioned mechanisms, while the skeptics are more inclined to question our understanding of the 
effects of e.g. greenhouse gases in view of the mentioned uncertainties. The final conclusion on this is 
a political question where the IPCC seems to favor a proactive stance where governments should 
formulate climate policy on the best available information, while some of the skeptics seem to 
advocate a wait and see attitude. 
 
In all of this, it is important to foster a sound understanding of the scientific process as a dialog where 
new elements are constantly emerging and where no final truth is ever going to be achieved. On this 
fluid background, we are nevertheless forced to make decisions that are going to affect our and future 
generations for a long time to come. 
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Slide 2.24 Uncertainties 
Uncertainties
This we know: 
 
This is likely to happen: This is uncertain: 
• We have a natural greenhouse 
effect due to greenhouse gases 
and clouds in the atmosphere. 
The most important greenhouse 
gases are H2O, CO2, CH4 og N2O 
 
• Since pre-industrial times, the 
concentrations of CO2, CH4 and 
N2 have increased by 31%, 
151% and 17%, respectively. 
The increases are due to man-
made emissions and have led to 
an enhanced greenhouse effect. 
 
• Observed climatic changes over 
the last century include:  
" Increased global mean 
temperature by 0.4–0.8 °C. 
The five warmest years after 
1860 have all occurred after 
1990. 
• Man-made emissions of 
greenhouse gases have 
contributed to the observed 
climate change. 
 
• With today's growth in emissions 
we can expect the following 
climate changes by year 2100: 
" Global increases in mean 
temperatures of 1.4–5.8 °C 
" Sea level rise: 10–90 cm 
(continuing for many hundred 
years) 
" More precipitation in wet 
areas and less in already dry 
areas 
• Strong and rapid climate change 
has occurred in earlier times, and 
we are uncertain what triggers 
this kind of instability, and when. 
 
• There is uncertainty with regard 
to how global warming will 
manifest itself at a regional and 
local level. 
 
• There is still great uncertainty 
with regard to: 
" Feedback effects, particularly 
associated with water vapor 
and clouds. 
" Cooling effects of particles 
" Indirect effects of solar 
variability. 
" The effects of global warming 
on strong storms. 
" Changes in ocean currents 
Source: IPCC (2001a)
 
 
 
3. Future climate change 
3.1 Scenarios for global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
A scenario is a description of how future development may evolve. Scenarios integrate qualitative 
storylines and quantitative formulations based on modeling. A set of emission scenarios can therefore 
contribute to understanding future developments of complex and integrated systems. Emission 
scenarios are important both for scientific assessments and policy makers, and are based on a set of 
assumptions, theories, and relations between central driving forces.  
 
Working Group III of the IPCC was in 1996 given the responsibility for developing a Special Report 
on Emission Scenarios (SRES), and the report was completed in 2000. The development of the new 
SRES scenarios started with a review and analysis of literature on existing global and regional 
scenarios. The formulation of four different storylines – called A1, A2, B1 and B2 – was a central part 
of the process. The storylines represent different paths with respect to economic, technical, social and 
environmental development. The A1 scenarios  (A1FI, A1T and A1B) describe a world with rapid 
economic growth, low population growth and rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technology. Major underlying themes are economic and cultural convergence and capacity building, 
with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The A2 scenario describes a 
very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is that of strengthening regional cultural identities, 
with an emphasis on family values and local conditions, high population growth, and less concern for 
rapid economic development. The B1 scenario is characterized as a world with rapid change in 
economic structures, “dematerialization,” and introduction of clean technologies. The emphasis is on 
global solutions to environmental and social sustainability, including concerted efforts for rapid 
technology development, dematerialization of the economy, and improving equity. The B2 scenario 
describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. It is again a heterogeneous world with less rapid, and more diverse technological 
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change, but a strong emphasis on community initiative and social innovation to find local, rather than 
global solutions. Slide 3.1 shows a schematic presentation of the new SRES scenarios. 
 
Slide 3.1. Schematic presentation of SRES scenarios 
Schematic presentation of SRES scenarios
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Environmental 
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Global 
 
solutions
  
 
Local 
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A1FI 
A1T 
A1B
 
B2
 
B1
 
A2
 
Very rapid economic growth, low population growth
 
and rapid introduction of new and more efficient
 
technology. 
 
A very heterogeneous world with, high 
population growth and less concern for rapid 
economic development.
 
A heterogeneous world with less rapid, 
and more diverse technological change 
and emphasis on local solutions to 
economic, social and environmental 
sustainability.
 
A convergent world with rapid change in economic
 
structures, "dematerialization" and introduction of
 
clean technologies. 
 
Source: CICERO
 
 
Six models were used to quantify these storylines, and 40 scenarios were developed altogether. All 
variants of a storyline were put together into a “family” of scenarios. The model-run that best 
represents each of the various storylines is called a marker scenario, and there are six such marker 
scenarios. There is one each from A2, B1, and B2, and three from A1. The three marker scenarios 
from A1 represent different developments with respect to energy technologies, but the other driving 
forces are assumed to be identical. A1FI is based on an intensive use of fossil fuels, A1T is based on 
other energy sources than fossil fuels, and A1B represents a balanced use of all energy sources 
(Nakicenovic, 2000). 
 
Since assumptions and events vary among the scenarios, they represent different future developments. 
It is therefore not surprising that the scenarios depict emissions that vary substantially. The emissions 
of CO2 have had and still have the largest impact on the increase in the greenhouse effect (see Slide 
2.16). The future emissions of this gas are therefore particularly important and interesting. Slide 3.2 
shows that the emissions of CO2 can vary between 6 and 29 billion tons carbon in 2100. Marker 
scenario A2 will have the highest emissions, important driving forces being high population growth, 
and high energy and carbon intensity.  
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Slide 3.2. Projected global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
Projected global anthropogenic CO2 emissions
Source: IPCC (2001a)
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The emissions of methane (CH4) also contribute significantly to the increased greenhouse effect, and 
the main sources are agriculture, waste treatment, and production of fossil fuels. The emissions of CH4 
are projected to vary between 240 and 890 million tons in 2100. The 1990 level was 310 million tons, 
so the scenarios predict a range of outcomes spanning from a small decrease in emissions to an 
increase of almost 300%. The third most important contribution to the increased greenhouse effect is 
the emissions of nitrous oxide (N2O). Emissions of N2O stem from agriculture, waste treatment, and 
industrial processes. The emissions of N2O are expected to stabilize at around 6-7 million tons N in 
2100, the exceptions being the A2 and A1FI scenarios. These scenarios both reach about 16.5 million 
tons N in 2100.  
 
While CO2, CH4 and N2O contribute to the increased greenhouse effect (and the warming), SO2 has a 
cooling effect through the formation of particles and clouds. The future emissions of this gas are 
therefore particularly important. Slide 3.3 shows that emissions of SO2 can vary between 20 and 60 
million tons of sulfur in 2100. Compared to the former set of emission scenarios from IPCC, the IS92 
scenarios, the new set of emission scenarios has significantly lower SO2 emissions. The reduction is 
due to structural changes in the energy system as well as concerns about local and regional air 
pollution. This is the most striking difference between the new SRES scenarios and the IS92 scenarios. 
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Slide 3.3. Projected global anthropogenic SO2-emissions 
Projected global anthropogenic SO2 emissions
Source: IPCC (2001a)
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3.2 Necessary emissions reductions for stabilizing concentrations 
The ultimate goal of the Climate Convention, as stated in Article 2, is to achieve “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” This should be taken as a starting point when 
discussing reductions of emissions. Stabilization of emissions is not enough to stabilize the 
concentrations at the same rate. If CO2 emissions are stabilized at the current emission level, the 
concentration in the atmosphere will still increase for at least two hundred years as a result of the long 
adjustment time.  
 
Stabilization scenarios illustrate implied rates of CO2 emission that would result in various stable CO2 
concentration levels. These have been projected using a similar methodology to that applied in the 
analysis of emissions scenarios. Slide 3.4 shows WRE (Wigley, Richels and Edmonds) trajectories 
that follow CO2 concentrations consistent with the IS92a scenario beginning in 1990 that branch off to 
reach constant CO2 concentrations of 450, 550, 650, 750 and 1000 ppmv (Wigley et al., 1996).3 The 
implied CO2 emissions are projected by two fast carbon cycle models, Bern-CC and ISAM. The 
ranges represent effects of different model parameterizations and assumptions. The results for the 
reference cases are not substantially different from those presented in the Second Assessment report 
(SAR). However, the range based on alternative model parameterizations is larger than that presented 
in the SAR, mainly due to the range of simulated terrestrial CO2 uptake.  
 
When discussing emission and stabilization scenarios, it is interesting to look into the reserves and 
resources of fossil fuels.4 Slide 3.5 shows carbon in oil, gas, and coal reserves and resources with 
                                                     
3
 The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere will increase by 1 ppmv if 2.123 PgC is emitted as a pulse to the 
amosphere. However, there will be a slow delay of this CO2 pulse due to uptake by the ocean and biosphere. 
 
4
 Reserves are those occurrences that are identified and measured as economically and technically recoverable 
with current technologies and prices. Resources are those occurrences with less certain geological and/or 
economic characteristics, but which are considered potentially recoverable with foreseeable technological and 
economic developments. The resource base includes both categories. On top of that, there are additional 
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historic fossil fuel carbon emissions 1860–1998, and with cumulative carbon emissions from two 
SRES scenarios and three IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) stabilization scenarios until 2100. 
The figure shows that there are abundant fossil fuel resources that will not limit carbon emissions 
during the 21st century. However, compared to the relatively large coal and unconventional oil and gas 
deposits, the carbon in proven conventional oil and gas reserves, or in conventional oil resources, is 
much less than the cumulative carbon emissions associated with stabilization of carbon dioxide at 
levels of 450 ppmv or somewhat higher. These resource data may imply a change in the energy mix 
and the introduction of new sources of energy during the 21st century. The choice of energy mix and 
associated investment will determine whether, and if so, at what level and cost, greenhouse 
concentrations can be stabilized. Currently most energy sector investments are directed at discovering 
and developing more conventional and unconventional fossil resources. 
 
 
Slide 3.4. Stabilization scenarios 
Stabilization scenarios
Panel (a) shows the assumed 
trajectories of CO2 concentration 
(WRE scenarios: Wigley et al., 1996) 
and panels (b) and (c) show the 
implied CO2 emissions, as projected 
with two fast carbon cycle models, 
Bern-CC and ISAM. The ranges 
represent effects of different model 
parameterizations and assumptions. 
For each model, the upper and lower 
bounds (corresponding to low- and 
high-CO2 parameterizations 
respectively) are indicated by the top 
and bottom of the shaded area. 
Alternatively, the lower bound 
(where hidden) is indicated by a 
hatched line. 
Source: IPCC (2001a )
(a)
(b)
(c)
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
quantities with unknown certainty of occurrence and/or with unknown or no economic significance in the 
foreseeable future, referred to as "additional occurrences" (IPCC, 1996b). Examples of such unconventional 
fossil fuel resources include tar sands, shale oil, other heavy oil, coal bed methane, deep geopressured gas, gas in 
acquifers, etc. 
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Slide 3.5. Reserves, resources and emissions 
Reserves, resources and emissions
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scenarios that lead to stabilization of CO2 concentrations at a range of levels.
Source: Modified from IPCC (2001c) 
 
 
 
3.3 Future climate trends at a global level  
For more than two centuries humans have tried to model climate and climate variability. Since Svante 
Arrhenius’s early projections in 1896, the field of climate simulations has evolved extensively. The 
climate models available today describe complicated processes and feedbacks, including hydrology, 
biology, ocean currents, sea ice, and clouds (see Slide 2.1).  
 
Based on the range of SRES emission scenarios and extensive study on climate models, IPCC has 
projected the globally averaged surface air temperature to increase by 1.4 to 5.8 ºC by 2100 relative to 
1990 (see Slide 3.6). The climate sensitivity is likely to be in the range of 1.5 to 4.5 ºC (an estimate 
unchanged from the two former IPCC Assessment Reports). 5  IPCC (1996a) projected a lower 
temperature change, with a range from 1.0 to 3.5 ºC, based on the former IS92 scenarios. The higher 
projected temperature and the wider range are due primarily to the lower projected sulfur dioxide 
emissions (cooling effect) in the SRES scenarios relative to the IS92 scenarios.  
 
 
                                                     
5
 Climate sensitivity usually refers to the long-term (equilibrium) change in global mean surface temperature 
following a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (or equivalent CO2) concentration ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 ºC. 
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Slide 3.6. The global climate of the 21st century 
The global climate of the 21st century
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Slide 3.7. Temperature change (OC) 
Temperature change (°C)
Source: IPCC (2001a)
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If we look back a hundred years, the temperature change has been between 0.4 and 0.8 ºC. It is 
therefore very likely that the projected rate of warming will be much larger than what we have 
experienced during the 20th century.6 Slide 3.7 shows the geographical response in temperature change 
for the SRES scenario B2, where projected global average surface temperature increase by 0.9-3.4 ºC. 
Land areas at high latitudes are likely to warm more rapidly than the global average.  
 
The warmer weather will amplify the observed retreat of glaciers and ice caps world wide through the 
21st century. In the Northern hemisphere, the snow cover and sea-ice is expected to decrease further. In 
the Antarctic, on the other hand, the ice sheet is expected to increase as a result of increased 
precipitation.   
 
The sea temperature, through terminal expansion, and the contribution from melting glaciers and ice 
caps determine the magnitude of sea level rise. Models have projected the globally averaged sea level 
to rise 0.09 to 0.88 meters by 2100. The sea level projections are lower than the ones presented in SAR 
primarily due to improved models that give less weight to ice sheets and glaciers. The projections 
show a continued increase both in warming and sea level rise well beyond 2100. 
 
The projections conducted by IPCC indicate that the warming will vary by region, and be 
accompanied by increases and decreases in precipitation. Global average precipitation is projected to 
increase during the 21st century. However, there are large regional differences especially between the 
northern and southern hemispheres. It is likely that precipitation will increase over northern mid- to 
high latitudes and Antarctica during winter.7 At lower latitudes, there are both regional increases and 
decreases over land areas. Generally the variability in precipitation will increase on all continents. 
 
A large-scale and possibly irreversible effect resulting from climate change may be the slowing or 
possibly complete shut-down of the ocean circulation that transports warm water to the North Atlantic. 
Although current projections using climate models do not project a complete shut-down of the 
thermohaline circulation by 2100, beyond this period, the thermohaline circulation could completely, 
and possibly irreversibly, shut down in either hemisphere if the changes in radiative forcing are large 
enough and exist over a long enough period.  
 
In addition to the changes in the average weather, the IPCC expects changes in the variability of 
climate and changes in the frequency and intensity of some extreme climate phenomena. Slide 3.8 
depicts the projected changes in some extreme weather and confidence levels.8  
 
                                                     
6
 In the Summary for Policymakers and in the Technical Summary from the Third Assessment Report (TAR) 
from IPCC, the following words have been used to indicate the confidence level: virtually certain (greater than 
99% chance that a result is true); very likely (90–99% chance); likely (66–90 % chance); medium likelihood (33–
66% chance); unlikely (10–33% chance); very unlikely (1–10% chance); exceptional unlikely (less than 1 % 
chance).  
7
 See footnote 5. 
8
 See footnote 5. 
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Slide 3.8. Projected changes in extreme weather and climate events  
Projected changes in extreme weather 
and climate events
• Higher maximum temperatures and more hot days over nearly all land 
areas (very likely).
• Higher minimum temperatures, fewer cold days and frost days over nearly 
all land areas (very likely).
• Reduced diurnal temperature range over most land areas (very likely).
• Increase of heat index i.e. temperature and humidity over land areas (very 
likely).
• More intense precipitation events (very likely).
• Increased summer continental drying and associated risk of drought 
(likely). 
• Increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities (likely). 
• Increase in tropical cyclone mean and peak precipitation intensities 
(likely). 
Source: IPCC (2001a)
 
 
Since SAR, the scientific community has managed to reduce some of the uncertainties through a wider 
range of detection techniques, separation of forced signals from internal variability, and multi-signal 
studies. Multi-signal studies address whether simulated response to a particular forcing agent is 
consistent with observations. All such studies conclude that anthropogenic greenhouse gases are likely 
to have made a substantial contribution to the 20th century warming (IPCC, 2001a). Despite 
improvements since TAR, there still are uncertainties, including the following:  
 
Slide 3.9. Remaining uncertainties 
Remaining Uncertainties
• Discrepancies between the vertical profile of temperature 
change in the troposphere seen in observations and models. 
• Large uncertainties in estimates of internal climate variability
from models and observations.
• Considerable uncertainty in the reconstructions of solar and 
volcanic forcing.
• Large uncertainties in anthropogenic forcing are associated 
with the effects of aerosols. 
• Large differences in the response of different models to the 
same forcing.
Source: IPCC (2001a)
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The accuracy of estimates of the magnitude of human induced warming continues to be limited by 
uncertainties in estimates of internal variability, natural and anthropogenic radiative forcing, and the 
climate response to external forcing.  
3.4 Future climate trends nationally: the case of Norway  
RegClim (Regional Climate Development under Global Warming) is a multi-institutional project 
aimed at estimating probable changes in the regional climate in Northern Europe. The large coarse-
resolution general circulation models (GCMs) are not capable of predicting regional climate because 
of the low geographical resolution of the simulation. Therefore, one important component of the 
project involves the statistical and dynamical downscaling of results from the global models to 
produce regional climate change scenarios for Norway. 
 
Slide 3.10. Changes in global average temperature 
Changes in global average temperature
Scenarios: GHG (greenhouse gasses); GSD (greenhouse gasses and direct effect of 
aerosols); and GSDIO (greenhouse gasses, direct and indirect effects of aerosols and the 
effects of ozone. 
Source: Fleichter (1999)
 
 
 
The first round of regional climate predictions is based on results from a climate model from the Max 
Planck Institute (MPI). Slide 3.10 shows the model runs with future scenarios for forcing agents as 
input: “GHG” includes all greenhouse gases; “GSD” includes the greenhouse gases and direct effects 
from aerosols; “GSDIO” includes the greenhouse gases, the direct and indirect effects of aerosols and 
the effects of ozone in the troposphere. The scenarios GHG and GSD give rise to larger temperature 
increases. RegClim bases its runs on the GSDIO scenario since this scenario better fits the 
observations. In the future, RegClim will make use of additional models and scenarios of forcing 
agents.  
 
The first RegClim scenario includes seasonal and inter-annual variability and probable changes in 
severe weather conditions, which are defined by high wind speeds, large precipitation amounts and 
extreme sea levels. The projections are given as differences between the average climate from 1980 to 
2000 and from 2030 to 2050. Given the input scenario, Norway can expect a warmer and wetter 
climate, with potentially more strong winds and more frequent storms along some part of the coastline. 
Average annual temperature is expected to increase by 0.2–0.5 °C each decade, and average annual 
precipitation is expected to increase by almost 10%. However, the RegClim results indicate that 
climate change will manifest itself differently across Norway (RegClim 2000) (see Slide 3.11).  
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Slide 3.11. Regional estimated changes in temperature and precipitation from 2000 to 2050 
Regional estimated changes in temperature and 
precipitation from 2000 to 2050
13,10,41,3winter
6,90,31,3autumn 
1,70,10,6summer
-4,1-0,11,0spring
4,30,21,1whole yearEastern Norway
9,30,61,2winter
23,51,51,1autumn 
18,21,00,7summer
1,20,10,9spring
13,50,81,0whole yearWestern Norway
5,20,22,0winter
18,20,81,7autumn 
1,50,11,2summer
5,00,21,4spring
7,80,31,6whole yearNorthern Norway 
Precipitation
change (percent)
Precipitation
change (mm/day)
Temperature
change (°C)
Source: RegClim (2000)
 
 
The greatest changes are expected in the autumn and winter, with milder temperatures and increased 
precipitation. Northern Norway will experience the greatest winter temperature increases, and 
generally the changes will be greater inland than in coastal areas. The western part of Norway is 
expected to receive substantially more rainfall, especially during summer and autumn, whereas 
Eastern Norway will experience more winter rainfall. Eastern parts may even experience a decline in 
precipitation during spring. The following maps show the regional distribution of a variety of different 
climate parameters (Slides 3.12–3.16).  
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Slide 3.12. Estimated change in average temperature (Jan. –Dec.) from 2000 to 2050 
Estimated change in average temperature (Jan.-Des.) 
from 2000 to 2050
Annual average 
temperature increase of 
0.2-0.5 °C per decade
Source: RegClim (2000)
 
 
There are large regional differences in temperature estimates. The temperature increase is expected to 
be greater inland compared to areas along the coast. Especially high temperature increases are 
expected in the region of Svalbard/Barents Sea.  
 
Slide 3.13. Changes in the length of the winter season from 2000 to 2050 
Changes in length of the winter 
season from 2000 to 2050
Shorter winter season
Source: RegClim (2000)
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It is especially the minimum temperatures during winter that are expected to increase resulting in a 
shortening of the cold season. Slide 3.13 shows that the number of days with a mean temperature 
lower than 0 °C will be reduced by 25–35 along the coast. The reduction in winter days inland will be 
more moderate with 15–25 days.  
 
Slide 3.14. Estimated change in precipitation (Sept.–Nov.) from 2000 to 2050 
Estimated change in precipitation 
(Sep.-Nov.) from 2000 to 2050
Increased precipitation 
especially during autumn
Source: RegClim (2000)
 
 
Precipitation will increase most during autumn, especially along the western coast  (20–30 %) and in 
the Svalbard/Barents Sea region.  
 
Slide 3.15. Change in precipitation intensity (Sept.–Nov.) 
Change in precipitation intensity (Sep.-Nov.) 
from 2000 to 2050
Increased precipitation 
intensity
Source: RegClim (2000)
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The increased precipitation does not necessarily relate to increased days with precipitation, but rather 
to increased intensity. There is expected to be 5–6 more days with more than 20 mm precipitation 
during the autumn along the western coast, particularly in Hordaland.  
 
Slide 3.16. Estimated change in wind force (Sept.-Nov.) from 2000 to 2050 
Estimated change in wind force (Sep.-Nov.) 
from 2000 to 2050
Increased wind force
Source: RegClim (2000)
 
 
 
The wind force is expected to increase most places in Norway during the autumn and winter. This 
increase is expected to be largest in Langfjella and along the coast of Møre and Trøndelag and in the 
Barents Sea east of Finnmark. The smallest increase can be found along the western coast south of 
Bergen and east of Lindesnes. The number of storms will increase to some extent, especially along the 
coast of Møre and Trøndelag.   
 
Most models show a weakening of the thermohaline circulation of the northern hemisphere, which 
contributes to a reduction of the surface warming in the North Atlantic. Whether a reduced Gulf 
Stream may mitigate or offset a warming effect in Norway is highly important for climate 
development in our areas. One hypothesis indicates that oceans bordering our coast will be covered by 
ice during large parts of the winter season. However, this must be regarded as highly speculative. 
Today we have limited knowledge about how the ocean currents behave with global warming.  
 
 
4. Climate change impacts 
4.1 Global impacts and adaptation 
Global mean surface temperature increases and rising sea level from the thermal expansion of the 
ocean are projected to continue for hundreds of years after the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations, owing to the long timescales on which the deep ocean adjusts to climate change. 
According to Slide 4.1, the target reduction of 5.2% negotiated in the Kyoto agreement is nowhere 
near sufficient to level out future temperature development. Therefore, any strategies designed to cope 
with climate change should focus, in addition to emission reductions, on impacts of and adaptation to 
climate change, climate variability, and extreme events.   
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Slide 4.1. Impact of the Kyoto Protocol 
Impact of the Kyoto Protocol 
Impact of the Kyoto
reduction target
Source: Hadley Centre for Prediction and Research, UK Met. Office 
  
 
 
Both natural and human systems are more or less sensitive to changes in climate, including mean 
climate characteristics, climate variability, and the frequency and magnitude of extreme events. The 
effects may be direct (e.g., a change in crop yield in response to a change in the mean, range, or 
variability of temperature) or indirect (e.g., damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal 
flooding due to sea level rise) (IPCC, 2001b). However, potential damage to systems from climate 
change and climate vulnerability, including extreme events, may be reduced through adaptation and 
coping strategies. System vulnerability is therefore determined by the magnitude and rate of climate 
variation to which a system is exposed, the system’s sensitivity and its adaptive capacity (see Slide 
4.2). 
 
A system capable of adapting to climate change has the potential to reduce the adverse impacts of 
climate change and enhance beneficial impacts. Slide 4.3 shows various adaptation types and 
examples. In natural systems, adaptation is reactive. In human systems, on the other hand, adaptation 
can also be anticipatory.   
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Slide 4.2. Sensitivity, adaptability and vulnerability 
Sensitivity, adaptability and vulnerability
• Sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected, either 
adversely or beneficially, by climate-related stimuli.
• Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to 
climate change, including climate variability and extremes, 
to moderate potential damages, take adventage of 
opportunities, or cope with the consequences.
• Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible 
to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate variability and extremes. 
Source: IPCC (2001b)
 
 
 
Slide 4.3. Types of adaptation to climate change 
Types of adaptation to climate change 
•compensatory payments, subsidies
•enforcement of building codes
•beach nourishment
•early-warning systems
•new building codes, design standards
•incentives for realocation 
Publicsystems
•changes in farm practices
•changes in insurance premiums
•purchase of air-conditioning
•purchase of incurance
•construction of house on stilts
•redesign of oil-rigs
Private
Human 
•changes in lenght of growing 
season
•changes in ecosystem compostition
•wetland migration 
Natural
systems 
Reactive Anticipatory 
Source: IPCC (2001b)
 
 
 
Relying on reactive adaptation to climate change may incur substantial ecological, social and 
economic costs. Many of these costs may be avoided if policies, programs and measures containing 
anticipatory adaptation to climate change are implemented. Natural systems are especially vulnerable 
to climate change due to their limited adaptive capacity. We know there are various constraints to 
achieving the potential for adaptation also within human systems. The private and public incentives 
 45 
for adaptation may be limited by institutional conditions and various sources of market failure. The 
ability of human systems to adapt depends on factors such as wealth, technology, education, 
information, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and management capabilities.  
 
Many developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change because of limited adaptive 
capacity due to widespread poverty, recurrent drought, inequitable land distribution, and dependence 
on rainfed agriculture. The agricultural sector is important both in terms of local and national food 
security and highly needed export earnings. If the farmers fail to harvest the anticipated amount of 
yields, this may have large implications not only for the small-scale farmer, but also for the national 
economy. As a result, these countries are more vulnerable to climate change and extreme weather 
events. To exemplify the vulnerability concept, we include a study from Uganda (Slide 4.4).  
 
Slide 4.4. Impact of temperature rise on robusta coffee in Uganda  
Uganda
 
 
Uganda depends heavily on coffee production, both in terms of employment and foreign exchange 
earnings. With a projected temperature increase of 2 oC, the areas suitable for growing robusta coffee 
will be dramatically reduced. Only the colder regions will be able to maintain the production. The 
adaptation capacity will determine how seriously affected a country like Uganda will be due to climate 
change.  
 
Enhancement of adaptive capacity both for human and natural systems will reduce the vulnerability of 
sectors and regions to climate change, including variability and extremes. In addition, reduced 
vulnerability may promote sustainable development and equity. 
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4.2 Global impacts on human systems and ecological sectors 
Climate change and climate variability will potentially have wide-ranging effects on the natural 
environment, as well as on human societies and economies. According to Slide 4.5 many human 
systems are sensitive to climate change.  
 
Slide 4.5. Potential climate changes impact 
Potential climate changes impact
 
 
Human health and a wide range of ecosystems and socio-economic sectors will most likely be affected 
by the projected changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea level, and related indirect effects.  
 
Regional studies indicate that increases in temperature have already affected a diverse set of physical 
and biological systems in many parts of the world. Examples include the shrinkage of glaciers, 
thawing of permafrost, later freezing and earlier break-up of ice on rivers and lakes, lengthening of 
mid- to high-latitude growing seasons, poleward and altitudinal shifts of plant and animal ranges, 
declines in some plant and animal populations, and earlier flowering of trees, emergence of insects, 
and egg laying in birds (IPCC, 2001b). According to WG I, the rate of warming is going to be greater 
than the global average over most land areas, and most pronounced at high latitudes in winter.  
 
We do not currently have sufficient climatic or biological data to quantify potential impacts related to 
changes in precipitation. However, there is emerging evidence that some social and economic systems 
have been affected by the recent increasing frequency of floods and drought in some areas. Future 
projections show increasing precipitation globally, although there will be large regional distributional 
differences between the northern and southern hemisphere as indicated in chapter 3.3.  
 
Sea level rise is referred to as an indirect effect of climate change. Sea level rise will be particularly 
critical for small island states and low-lying costal areas. A sea level rise of 5 mm per year over the 
next 100 years will result in enhanced coastal erosion, loss of land, dislocation of people, increased 
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risk of damage from storm surges, saltwater intrusion into freshwater resources, and so on (IPCC, 
2001b). A range of impacts may have high environmental, economic and social costs.  
  
The IPCC expects extreme events to increase in frequency and/or severity during the 21st century as a 
result of changes in the mean and/or variability of climate. With respect to temperature, there is a very 
high level of confidence that daytime maximum and minimum temperatures will increase, 
accompanied by an increased frequency of hot days. 9 Projections indicate with high confidence that 
heat waves will become more frequent, while the number of cold waves and of frost days will decline 
(IPCC, 2001b). The warmer weather during summer may potentially be particularly critical in some 
urban areas during the summer. The frequency and magnitude of extreme low temperature events, on 
the other hand, are projected to decrease in the future. This will have both positive and negative 
effects. With respect to precipitation, the projected increase in intensity in some regions may have 
substantial impacts on water quality, loss of land, pollution, erosion and so on. Whether there will be 
an increase in storm activity is more uncertain. Projections indicate with medium confidence that the 
intensity of mid-latitude storms and the frequency of hail and lightening are expected to increase 
(IPCC, 2001b). Historically, human societies and natural systems have proven vulnerable to climate 
extremes though damage, hardship, and death caused by events such as draught, floods, heat waves, 
avalanches, and windstorms. Most likely the impacts of climate extremes will fall disproportionately 
on the poor parts of the world. 
 
What the potential impacts will be of a weakening or a shut-down of the ocean thermohaline 
circulation is highly uncertain. Such major changes may have impact on deep-water oxygen levels and 
carbon uptake by oceans and marine ecosystems, and might reduce warming over parts of Europe.  
 
Adverse global impacts listed in TAR are projected from models and studies and include the 
following:  
 
Slide 4.6. Adverse impacts on human systems 
Adverse impacts on human systems
• A general reduction in potential crop yields in most tropical and sub-
tropical regions for most projected increases in temperature.
• Decreased water availability for populations in many water scarce 
regions, particularly in the sub-tropics. 
• An increase in the number of people exposed to vector-borne 
diseases (e.g. malaria) and water-borne diseases (e.g. cholera) and 
increase in heat stress mortality. 
• A widespread increase in the risk of flooding for many human 
settlements from both increased heavy precipitation events and sea-
level rise.
• Increased energy demand for space cooling due to higher summer 
temperatures.
Source: IPCC (2001b)
 
 
                                                     
9
 In the TAR Summary for Policymakers from Working Group II (IPCC, 2001b), the following words have been 
used where appropriate to indicate judgmental estimates of confidence: very high (95% or greater), high (67–
95%), medium (33–67%), low (5–33%), and very low (5% or less). 
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However, there are also projected beneficial impacts due to climate change and these include the 
following: 
 
Slide 4.7. Beneficial impacts on human systems 
Beneficial impacts on human systems
• Increased potential crop yields in some regions at 
mid-latitudes for increases in temperature of less than 
a few degrees Celsius.
• A potential increase in global timber supply for 
appropriate managed forests.
• Increased water availability for populations in some 
water scarce regions, for example in parts of South 
East Asia.
• Reduced winter mortality in mid- and high-latitudes.
• Reduced energy demand for space heating due to 
higher winter temperatures. 
Source: IPCC (2001b) 
 
 
 
4.3 Water resources    
One third of the world’s population lives in countries that are water stressed. Projections indicate that 
this number will increase to around 5 billion by 2025 due to population growth and increased demand. 
Slide 4.8 shows projected changes in average annual water runoff by 2050, relative to average runoff 
for 1960–1990. The changes largely follow projected changes in precipitation, and therefore the level 
of evaporation is assumed to be unchanged. Areas most vulnerable to domestic water shortages 
include those where access to water is already limited. Areas in the high latitudes and Southeast Asia 
will experience increased runoff. Central Asia, the area around the Mediterranean, southern Africa, 
and Australia, on the other hand will experience decreases in runoff in the future (IPCC, 2001b).  
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Slide 4.8. Changes in average annual water runoff by 2050.   
Changes in average annual water 
runoff by 2050
< -250 < -250 to -150 -150 to -50 -50 to -25 -25 to 0 0 to 25 25 to 50 50 to 150 >150
Change in Annual Runoff (mm  yr-1)
(a)
(b)
Source: IPCC (2001a)
 
 50 
Impacts of climate change – including direct effects such as changes in temperature, precipitation and 
sea levels – and indirect effects such as floods, evaporation, and higher water temperature will 
influence the availability and quality of freshwater around the world. This will exacerbate periodic and 
chronic shortfalls of water, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. The same areas are experiencing 
rapid population growth, urbanization, financial problems, and lack of human capital.  
4.4 Food Security 
Changes in temperature, precipitation, length of the growing season, and timing of extreme events will 
have an effect on agricultural production. Recent studies strengthen the conclusion from SAR (IPCC, 
1996b) that “global agricultural production could be maintained relative to baseline production” for a 
growing population under 2xCO2 equilibrium climate conditions. In a food security perspective, 
however, the regional distributional effects are of vital interest. Global agricultural production could 
be maintained, regardless of how the regional distribution changes. Middle to high latitudes may 
experience increases in productivity, depending on crop type, the seasonality of precipitation, etc. In 
contrast, there are several countries in the tropics and subtropics – where some crops are near their 
maximum temperature tolerance and dry conditions dominates – yields are likely to decrease (IPCC, 
2001b). The number of malnourished people amounted to 800 million in 1998 (IPCC, 1998). Many of 
these people are found in environmentally, economically and socially stressed areas. Slide 4.9 lists 
some of the potential impacts on food security resulting from climate change, including confidence 
levels.  
 
Slide 4.9. Climate change impacts on food security 
Climate change impacts on food security
• Both positive and negative responses for mid-latitude 
crops when adaptation is included (medium 
confidence). 
• A general reduction in potential crop yields in most 
tropical and sub-tropical regions (medium confidence). 
• Income from agricultural production will increase in 
developed countries and there will be smaller or 
negative changes in developing regions (medium 
confidence). 
Source: IPCC (2001b) 
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4.5 Biodiversity 
Climate change will influence the geographical location of the ecological systems and the mix of 
species that they contain. Based on model simulations of vegetation distribution, large shifts of 
vegetation boundaries into higher latitudes and elevations can be expected (IPCC, 1998). Many 
species have rather restricted climatic niches and are unable to migrate due to fragmentation of the 
landscape, soil differences, or topography. These species are particular vulnerable to changes in 
climate.  
 
Many ecosystems are already under stress from human induced activities such as land-use change, 
deposition of pollutants, harvesting, grazing by livestock, and others. Climate change and variability 
constitute an additional pressure that could endanger some ecosystems and species. Species already 
classified as critically endangered will be lost, and species labeled endangered or vulnerable will 
become much more rare (IPCC, 2001b). Many important costal ecosystems, such as coral reefs, 
mangrove, and sea grass beds are vulnerable to rising temperatures and accelerated sea level rise.   
 
Slide 4.10. Climate change impacts on biodiversity 
Climate change impacts on biodiversity
• Substantial ecosystem or biome movement  (high confidence). 
• Loss of critical endangered species (high confidence).
• Poleward movement of the southern and northern boundaries of 
fish distributions (medium confidence).   
• Increased net primary productivity in most systems due to 
increased CO2 concentration (high confidence). 
• Decreased net primary productivity in arid or semi-arid areas 
(medium confidence).
• Forests will replace some wetlands, and areas with permafrost 
will be disrupted (high confidence).
Source: IPCC (2001b)
 
 
 
 
4.6 Human health  
Global climate change will have diverse impacts on human health – some positive, but most negative 
(IPCC, 2001b). Many of the world’s known vector-borne, food-borne and water-borne infectious 
diseases are sensitive to changing climatic conditions (Slide 4.11).  
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Slide 4.11. Spread of major tropical vector-borne diseases 
Spread of major tropical vector-borne diseases
Source: GRID Arendal/UNEP
 
 
 
Studies show that the geographic range of potential transmission of malaria and dengue will show a 
net increase given the projected climate change. Assessment of potential impacts of changes in 
temperature and precipitation suggests that large areas will experience increased risk due to expansion 
of the areas suitable for malaria transmission.   
 
More frequent and stronger floods are likely to have health effects through increased risk of drowning, 
diarrhea, and respiratory diseases and, in developing countries, hunger and malnutrition. There are 
also other direct effects from climate change that are critical to human health such as periods with 
either extremely hot or extremely cold weather. If heat waves occur more frequently and with 
increased intensity, the risk of death and illness will increase, especially among the elderly and the 
urban population. 
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Slide 4.12. Climate change impacts on human health 
Climate change impacts on food security
• Both positive and negative responses for mid-latitude 
crops when adaptation is included (medium 
confidence). 
• A general reduction in potential crop yields in most 
tropical and sub-tropical regions (medium confidence). 
• Income from agricultural production will increase in 
developed countries and there will be smaller or 
negative changes in developing regions (medium 
confidence). 
Source: IPCC (2001b) 
 
 
 
4.7 National climate change impacts: the case of Norway 
As an affluent country situated in high latitudes, Norway is often assumed to benefit from warmer 
global temperatures. In fact, the possibility of milder winters and warmer summer temperatures gives 
many people the misconception that climate change will be unproblematic for Norway, unless the 
warm ocean currents of the North Atlantic Current change. Sea-level rise associated with climate 
change is generally disregarded as a problem in Norway, despite the potential impacts on some 
municipalities. However, recent results from RegClim (see section 3.4) show that Norway can expect 
a warmer but also wetter climate, with potentially stronger winds and more frequent storms along 
some part of the coastline. The RegClim results also indicate that climate change will manifest itself 
differently across Norway. As a country covering many degrees of latitude, with an extensive coastline 
and a mountainous terrain, Norway may be more vulnerable to climate change in some regions than 
others.   
 
A preliminary review of the literature on potential climate impacts in Norway reveals that a number of 
sector-, region-, and species-specific studies have been carried out over the past decade. However, 
there has been no comprehensive synthesis and analysis of socio-economic impacts of climate change 
in Norway. Therefore, Center for Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO) recently organized 
a workshop on climate impacts in Norway, which gathered experts from various fields, to discuss the 
state of knowledge and, if possible, say something about potential impacts in various sectors (Sygna 
and O’Brien 2000). Sectors that are most vulnerable to potential changes in temperature, precipitation, 
and the frequency and magnitude of extreme events are listed below, including potential effects.  
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Slide 4.13. Vulnerable sectors in Norway (1) 
Vulnerable sectors in Norway (1)
Transport
Climate related events:  flooding; fog; landslides; avalanches; 
warm winters; storms; frost heave.
Consequences: variable driving conditions; less predictability; 
cancelled and delayed airplanes, trains, ferries and other modes of 
transportation; higher maintenance costs.  
Hydropower 
Climate related events: increased runoff; changing flood regimes; 
warmer winters.
Consequences: increased electricity production; reduced 
predictability; reduced dam safety; lower demand for electricity
during winter. 
Source: CICERO
 
 
Slide 4.14. Vulnerable sectors in Norway (2) 
Vulnerable sectors in Norway (2)
Fisheries
Climate related events:  warmer ocean; change in ocean currents; 
melting of inland ice; more freshwater in fjords; 
Consequences: increased fish production; change in species 
composition; movement of fish species to colder areas; 
introduction of new species; incidents of pests and algae 
blooming more frequent. 
Agriculture
Climate related events: longer growing season; CO2 fertilization; 
erosion. 
Consequences: increased production; change in frequency of 
pests, changes in water availability; loss of agricultural land.
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
Compared to many other countries, especially less developed countries (as commented in chapter 4.1), 
Norway is relatively robust with respect to climate change and climate variability. We are not 
particularly vulnerable to sea level rise, Norway is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, and we 
are used to bad weather. However the RegClim results show that climate change will not occur evenly 
across the country. In addition, some regions, sectors, ecosystems and social groups within Norway 
are more vulnerable to climate change than others. Some sectors of society will be capable of adapting 
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to changing climatic conditions; others will be more marginalized and increasingly vulnerable. 
Regardless of the aggregate resilience to climate change, climate change is of concern for Norway in 
that it has implications for regional recreational opportunities, income, employment, and demographic 
distribution.      
 
 
5. The status of climate policy negotiations 
5.1 The negotiation process up to the Climate Convention in 1992 
Throughout the 1980s, there was an increasing concern among the natural scientists that the changes in 
the atmosphere’s chemical composition could result in climate changes. A series of international 
meetings and conferences were arranged on this topic. The United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) responded by founding a working group 
whose first task was to propose an international agreement. The scientific progress was rapid during 
this period, mainly due to the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC). In 1990, the UN’s 
General Assembly established a negotiation committee (International Negotiation Committee for the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, INC/UNFCCC) as a response to the working group’s 
proposal. The INC’s mandate was to draw up proposals for a convention or other binding international 
agreement that could be a first step towards solving the climate problem. The INC had five sessions 
between February 1991 and May 1992. These meetings brought together negotiators from more than 
150 states. The result was a proposal for a convention, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
The proposed convention was signed by 155 states at the Rio conference in June 1992. More states 
have signed it since then. The UNFCCC entered into force in March 1994, 90 days after the 50th state 
had ratified it. The main events concerning the establishment of the UNFCCC are shown in Slide 5.1. 
 
Slide 5.1. Processes prior to the UNFCC 
Processes prior to 
the UNFCCC
• 1980s Increased concern for human-induced climate 
changes
• 1990 UN’s General Assembly establishes a negotiation 
committee (INC) 
• 1991-1992 More than 150 states participate in 5 rounds of 
negotiations
• May 1992 The INC proposes a climate convention 
(UNFCCC)
• June 1992 Top meeting in Rio. The proposed climate 
convention is signed by 155 states
• March 1994 The UNFCC enters into force
Source: CICERO
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5.2 The Climate Convention 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is ambitious 
since it defines targets for the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The 
ultimate goal of the Climate Convention, as stated in Article 2, is to achieve “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The UNFCCC is not clear on how high 
these concentrations can be, nor does it indicate how the objective of stabilization is to be 
met. The most important contribution of the UNFCCC was therefore probably the mere 
acknowledgement of the climate problem. Slide 5.2 describes some of the main features of 
the UNFCCC. Central features include the following: 
 
Slide 5.2. Main features of the Climate Convention 
Main features of the 
Climate Convention
Main goal: Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system
Precautionary: The precautionary principle is acknowledged
Groups of countries: Annex I, Annex II, and developing countries
Responsibility: The industrialized countries have historical responsibility
Commitments: Annex I countries are recommended to stabilize emissions 
at 1990 level within year 2000
Institutions:      Secretariat
Conference of the Parties (COP)
Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI)
Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA)
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
1. The UNFCCC acknowledges the precautionary principle. 
 
2. The UNFCCC distinguishes three main groups of countries: The industrialized countries, 
including those countries with economies in transition, are listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC. 
Annex II lists only those countries that were members of the OECD when the UNFCCC was 
established in 1992. The third group of countries mentioned is developing countries.  
 
3. The UNFCCC places the main responsibility on the rich countries (Annex I countries). It is 
pointed out that these countries have a special responsibility to set an example since they 
account for the most of the accumulated historical emissions of greenhouse gases.   
 
4. The UNFCCC established important institutions for the future work. The Conference of the 
Parties (COP), where all Parties participate, is the highest body of the UNFCCC. The first 
COP took place in Berlin in March 1995, and the most recent was COP6 in The Hague in 
November 2000. The secretariat conducts necessary coordination and ensures the flow of 
information. The COP is supported by two sub-committees, SBI (Subsidiary Body on 
Implementation) and SBSTA (Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice). 
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The UNFCCC does not imply commitments of any kind that would significantly reduce the global 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). On the contrary, it has been clear that the UNFCCC, as it was 
decided at the Rio Conference, was primarily meant to form the basis for an international agreement 
that can ensure emission reductions. An important part of this has been that the countries, by ratifying 
the UNFCCC, acknowledge the climate problem, and that they participate in the COPs. The Parties 
have certain commitments that ensure that the work of implementing measures is initiated. 
 
Annex I countries are committed to implementing certain measures. Article 4.2b of the UNFCC states 
that: “…each of these Parties shall communicate…detailed information on its policies and 
measures…with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol.” 
This is the most concrete text on emission reductions in the UNFCCC. Annex II countries also have a 
special commitment to finance the developing countries’ reporting, and assist developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable for climate changes. Annex II countries must also take steps to arrange 
for transfer of technology to other Parties, especially developing countries. The UNFCCC has been 
ratified by 186 countries as of the 7th of September 2000.  
 
5.3 Negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol 
The first Conference of the Parties (COP1) was arranged in Berlin in March/April 1995. The Parties’ 
implementation of the UNFCCC was summarized and some important decisions were made.  
 
One such important decision was to initiate a pilot phase for joint implementation (JI) of climate 
measures up to year 2000. JI entails cooperation between two or more Parties to fulfill their national 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions. This separates the commitment of each country from the 
implementation of measures. No credits were to be given for GHG reductions in this pilot phase. To 
distinguish the activities in the pilot phase from a fully developed JI mechanism, they were called 
“Activities Implemented Jointly” (AIJ). 
 
Slide 5.3. The Berlin-Mandate 
Berlin-mandate:
Acknowledges that the commitments to reduce emissions under the UNFCC 
are not sufficient.
Will start a process towards a negotiation process that should lead to GHG 
emission reductions in Annex I countries after 2000.
Quantified and time-scheduled emission targets for 2005, 2010 and 2020, and 
necessary measures and means were to be decided.
In accordance to the Parties’ differentiated responsibilities, respective 
capacities, and different economic structures and resource bases.
The process shall be conducted in “the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate”
(AGBM) where all parties could participate, and finalized in 1997 at COP3.
Source: CICERO
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The so-called Berlin mandate was adopted at this first COP (COP1). The Berlin mandate calls for the 
initiation of a negotiation process that should lead to GHG emission reductions in Annex I countries 
after 2000. The negotiations were to be finalized before COP3 in December 1997. The negotiations 
took place through “the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate” (AGBM) in which all Parties could 
participate. Quantified and time-scheduled emission targets, and necessary measures and means were 
to be decided. Both the UNFCCC and the Berlin mandate state that these decisions should be made in 
accordance to the Parties’ differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities. Slide 5.3 describes 
the main features of the Berlin mandate. COP2 took place in Geneva in July 1996, where the USA 
came out with clear support of the newly released second report from IPCC and stated that countries 
should take on binding commitments to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. There was 
widespread support for flexibility in terms of a basket approach of gases and the opportunity to use JI 
and emissions trading to meet national reduction commitments. Another important issue was equal or 
differentiated reduction commitments. 
5.4 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, at COP3 in December 1997 after a number of 
meetings in the AGBM. The final text was a result of intense negotiations where the “big four” – 
USA, EU, Japan and G77/China (developing countries) – had the most influence. The entry-into-force 
provision of the Protocol not only requires ratification by 55 Parties, but also employs a  “double 
trigger” that specifies that ratifying Annex-I Parties must also represent at least 55% of the total 
Annex-I CO2 emissions in the year 1990. USA alone represents 36% of CO2 emissions in Annex I in 
1990. As of March the 19th of 2001, 84 Parties have signed the Kyoto Protocol, but only 33 have 
ratified it. Romania is the only country with commitments to reduce emissions that have ratified the 
Protocol. Those that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol are mainly small island states, some Latin 
American countries, and former Soviet Union republics. The main components of the Kyoto Protocol 
are described below and summarized in Slide 5.4  
 
• The industrialized countries are to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions by 5.2% in the 
period 2008–2012 compared to base year 1990. Each country’s commitment is defined in an 
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. Annex B is an updated version of industrialized countries as 
defined in Annex I of the Climate Convention and consists of OECD countries and economies in 
transition to a market economy. The developing countries do not have any commitments to 
reduce their emissions in this first commitment period. 
 
• Six gases or groups of gases are included in the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorcarbons (PFC), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). 
 
• The reduction targets are differentiated between countries and varies between +10% for 
Iceland and –8% for the EU, most countries with economies in transitions (Russia and Ukraine 
are exceptions as they have 0%), New Zealand, and Switzerland. The USA has –7% whereas 
Norway has +1%. See Slide 5.5 for details on the burden sharing. 
 
• The Kyoto Protocol also includes the possibility for countries to participate in a “bubble.” 
Their overall emission reductions must be in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, but the burden 
can be distributed within the “bubble.” The EU has formed such a “bubble” where the internal 
burden sharing ranges from +27% for Portugal to –21% for Denmark and Germany, and –28% 
for Luxembourg. See Slide 5.6 for details of the EU burden sharing. 
 
• Three mechanisms for cooperation on emission reductions across country borders are 
introduced: international emissions trading (IET, referred to here as simply “emissions trading”), 
Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development mechanism (CDM). These mechanisms are 
often referred to as flexibility mechanisms, or simply as the Kyoto mechanisms. The most 
important motivation is to increase cost-effectiveness by reducing the countries’ costs of fulfilling 
the required emissions reductions. Emissions trading and JI can only occur among Annex I 
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countries, whereas the CDM can take place between countries with and without emissions targets. 
See Slide 5.7 and the text for further details on the mechanisms, where also domestic emission 
trading is included. The Protocol states that private entities (agents) may participate in the CDM 
and that legal entities may participate in JI, whereas private entities are not mentioned in relation 
to emissions trading. 
 
Slide 5.4. Main features of the Kyoto Protocol 
Main features of the
Kyoto Protocol
Industrialized countries are to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions by 5.2% 
in the period 2008–2012 compared to the base year 1990. 
Differentiated reduction targets ranging from –8 to +10%.
Possibility to participate in a “bubble” to jointly reduce emissions.
Six gases or groups of gases are included: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, and 
SF6. 
There is an opening for including sequestration of CO2 in forests and soils.
Three flexible mechanisms are specified: International emissions trading
(IET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development mechanism 
(CDM).
Source: CICERO
 
 
Slide 5.5. Differentiated reduction targets 
Differentiated 
reduction targets
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Slide 5.7 summarizes the main features of the Kyoto mechanisms as defined in the Kyoto Protocol. JI 
and the CDM differ from emissions trading in that they are project-based. JI involves cooperation 
between Annex I countries only. One country (the investor country) funds, and possibly also conducts 
emissions reduction projects in another (the host country). JI will draw on the experience from the 
four-year pilot phase, “Activities Implemented Jointly” (AIJ), which was established at the Berlin 
Conference in 1995. AIJ did not result in carbon credits, and operated with relatively open criteria. 
The difference between JI and emissions trading is that under JI, the host country transfers emissions 
reduction units to the investor country based on an agreed-upon and verified estimate of the emissions 
reduction units determined by the JI project, while under emissions trading, quotas are transferred 
based on an agreed price (Holtsmark and Alfsen, 1998). 
 
Slide 5.6. Sharing the –8% reduction within the EU 
Sharing the –8% reduction 
within the EU
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The CDM is one of the most interesting components of the Kyoto Protocol since it is the only direct 
manner in which non-Annex I countries are involved in emission abatement measures. It is also highly 
relevant because certified emissions reductions were to be obtained from the year 2000 to achieve 
compliance for the first commitment period. The purpose of the CDM is, as stated in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, to “to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development 
and…to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation.” The CDM will require the creation of an Executive Board whose powers, composition and 
relation to COP/MOP will be decided by the COP.10 The CDM will be open for private or public 
entities of investor and host nations to participate in project activities that result in certified emissions 
reductions and in the acquisition of these. Further, a share of the proceeds from project activities is to 
be used to cover administrative expenses and to assist developing countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change to meet adaptation costs (Dessus, 1998). One of the main questions 
concerning the CDM is whether carbon sequestration from land use, land-use change, and forestry 
(LULUCF) will count as official GHG reductions. This is discussed in section 5.6. 
 
                                                     
10
 MOP is Meeting Of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Slide 5.7. Mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions trading 
Mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions trading
Mechanism Unit Participants Features
Domestic emissions 
trading
Quota Firms and other national 
agents
Link to 
international 
emissions trading 
International emissions 
trading
Quota
Assigned amount unit 
(AAU)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries); 
private agents?
Supplementarity
Joint Implementation Credit
Emission reduction unit 
(ERU)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries); 
private agents?
Supplementarity
Monitoring and 
verification
Clean Development 
Mechanism
Credit
Certified emission 
reductions (CER)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries) 
and non-Annex B 
countries (developing 
countries)
Supplementarity
Monitoring and 
verification
Tax as share of 
proceeds
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
5.5 The status of negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol left a number of challenging issues unresolved, with the common understanding 
that these issues would have to be negotiated later. The main issues are rules for the Kyoto 
mechanisms, accounting for sources and sinks for greenhouse gases from land use changes and 
forestry, and funding mechanisms and capacity building in developing countries (particularly those 
that are the most vulnerable to climate changes or to negative side effects of climate policy measures 
undertaken in industrialized countries). At the fourth conference of the Parties to the Climate 
Convention (COP4) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1998, the “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” was 
adopted. The aim of the plan was to finalize negotiations on remaining issues by COP6 in The Hague, 
the Netherlands, in November 2000. 
 
The President of COP6, the Dutch minister of environment Mr. Pronk, suspended the conference 
because the Parties were not able to find acceptable compromises on a number of important issues. 
The last couple of days of the negotiations were focused on a compromise proposal submitted by Mr. 
Pronk, the so-called “Pronk paper”. Plans were made to resume the conference in May in Bonn, where 
meetings of the subsidiary bodies to the Climate Convention should take place, but the plans were 
postponed at the request of the American delegation because the new Bush administration wanted 
more time to prepare for these negotiations. Thus the conference will resume in Bonn 16–27 July 
2001. In the meantime, Parties have met at several occasions to try to bridge differences, but without 
much progress so far. Mr. Pronk put a new compromise proposal on the table in April 2001, 
containing particular efforts to bridge the differing views on including Land Use, Land-Use Change 
and Forestry (LULUCF) projects, which we refer to as “the second Pronk paper”. 
 
An overview of the most important negotiation issues in The Hague is shown in Slide 5.8. Even 
though substantial difficulties in the negotiations remain, progress on number of issues was noted. 
Rules for reporting and handling of information are more or less finalized. The USA backed off from 
its earlier position to demand early participation by developing countries to commit to reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions. The USA also retreated from its proposal to have a very wide definition of 
applicable carbon stock changes related to forestry, land use and land use change, and now seems to 
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accept a more limited approach. The EU took a step away from its proposal to have a concrete capping 
(capping) on the use of the Kyoto mechanisms.11 Finally, progress was observed in terms of transfer 
mechanisms to developing countries to help them cope with climate change and side effects of climate 
policies in industrialized countries. 
 
Slide 5.8. The most important negotiation issues after COP6 in The Hague in November 2000 
The most important negotiation issues after 
COP6 in the Hague in November 2000
Issues Negotiation status 
Rules for the Kyoto mechanisms Disagreement on a quantitative ceiling 
on the use of the mechanisms. 
Disagreement on nuclear power and 
large hydropower projects. 
 Emissions trading Disagreement on taxing. 
 Joint implementation Disagreement on taxing. 
 Clean Development 
Mechanism 
Disagreement on forestry projects. 
Accounting for sources and sinks related 
to land use change and forestry 
Different views on what forestry, land 
use and land use change activities that 
are acceptable to include. 
Funding mechanisms and capacity 
building in developing countries 
Uncertain if the funding package 
proposed by Mr. Pronk is acceptable 
to developing countries. 
Enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol Progress has been made, but 
differences remain as to choice of 
sanctions. 
Information and reporting Only details remain to negotiate. 
 
Source: CICERO
 
 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol states that Parties may participate in emissions trading for the purpose 
of fulfilling their commitments, and that “any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions.”  
In relation to the Kyoto mechanisms, the EU has proposed a capping on purchasing and selling quotas, 
referring to Article 6 on Joint Implementation and Article 17 on emissions trading in the Kyoto 
Protocol that state that the acquisition of emissions reduction units and trading must be supplemental 
to domestic action. Further arguments for this proposal include the necessity of providing strong 
enough incentives for developing new, efficient green technologies at the domestic level and reducing 
the flow of so-called hot air from Russia and Ukraine.12 
In the case of emissions trading, the EU’s proposal suggests that net acquisitions of quotas, which are 
called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), must not exceed the higher of two ceilings:  
 
• Five percent of the average of its base year emissions and its number of AAUs, or 
 
• Fifty percent of the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of the period 
from 1994 to 2002 and its number of AAUs. 
 
                                                     
11
 The EU’s comment from 25 November 2000 to Mr. Pronk’s paper states: “Each Annex I Party shall meet its 
commitments primarily through domestic action since 1990. This means that use of the mechanisms under 
Article 6, 12 and 17 shall not exceed reductions achieved through domestic actions as reported in national 
communications and reviewed under Article 8. Compliance with this principle will be assessed by the 
enforcement branch of the compliance committee on the basis of qualitative and quantitative information.”  
12
 The background for hot air is the Kyoto Protocol target of the same emissions in 2008-12 as 1990 for these 
countries. Hot air refers to a surplus of quotas resulting from the economic recession in these countries after 
1990, whereby emissions of carbon dioxide are strongly reduced and not likely to reach 1990 levels by 2010. 
Consequently, there is likely to be a large volume of quotas for export that do not result from any climate policy 
measures. 
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The EU proposal also includes a limit on net transfers, as it states that net transfers of AAUs must not 
exceed 5% of the average of its base year emissions and its number of AAUs. However, the ceiling 
may increase if a party carries out domestic abatement, at least in the same amount as they are 
exporting permits. In such situations there will be no limits on their export. 
 
The Umbrella Group, which includes the USA and Norway, strongly opposed the ceiling (capping) 
proposal, claiming that this would be a de facto renegotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, and that the cost-
effectiveness potential of the Kyoto mechanisms would be severely harmed. Most developing 
countries sympathized with EU’s view, but some opposed the idea of a ceiling on the mechanisms. 
 
The Pronk paper states “Annex I Parties shall meet their emission commitments primarily through 
domestic action since 1990. Compliance with this principle will be assessed by the facilitative branch 
of the compliance committee on the basis of qualitative and quantified information, reported in 
national communications and reviewed under Article 8.” Apparently Mr. Pronk has tried to strike a 
balance between the positions of the EU and the USA, but the compromise seems closer to the USA’s 
position than the EU’s. 
 
The Pronk paper expresses concern that a strong and enforceable compliance regime is not sufficient 
to prevent Parties from overselling quotas. To meet this challenge, Annex B Parties must retain a 
portion of their assigned amounts in their national registries for the specified period, equal to 70% of 
their assigned amounts, or the portion determined on the basis of emissions or projected emissions. 
This means that only up to 30% of the assigned amount can be traded as quotas between countries. 
 
Developing countries (the G77/China group) wanted taxes on emissions trading and JI similar to that 
on the CDM, as stated by the Kyoto Protocol. The proposed tax would cover administrative expenses 
and assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. The 
industrialized countries opposed a tax on emissions trading and JI. In his compromise proposal, Mr. 
Pronk proposed that emissions trading and JI would be later taxed unless industrialized countries raise 
at least 1 billion USD annually by 2005 for two funds that would support developing countries in their 
adaptation to climate change efforts, capacity building, technical support and technology transfer. 
Another controversial issue relates to project types, where a few Parties favor including nuclear power 
and large hydropower projects, whereas many Parties disagree. 
 
In terms of forestry, land use, and land use changes, the USA, Canada and Japan argued for including 
a wide range of changes in the carbon stock from forestry activities, land use changes, and land use, 
e.g. change in soil carbon due to agriculture practices. This would imply that some countries could 
count a substantial contribution from carbon sinks toward meeting their Kyoto Protocol target, thus 
reducing the need for abating energy-related emissions. The EU, Norway, and most developing 
countries opposed this view and argued that the Kyoto Protocol targets would be undermined given 
such liberal rules. Furthermore, incentives for developing new green technologies would be weakened, 
particularly if liberal rules also applied to the CDM, which would lead to a large volume of cheap 
forestry quotas from developing countries.  
 
Some progress in the negotiations on funding mechanisms and capacity building for developing 
countries was observed. However, there is significant uncertainty whether developing countries are 
willing to accept the compromise proposal forwarded by Mr. Pronk. He proposed establishing an 
adaptation fund and a convention fund under the Global Environmental Facility. At least 1 billion 
USD annually would be transferred from industrialized countries to the funds. Many developing 
countries are also skeptical to the linkage to the Global Environment Facility due to its close relation 
with the World Bank. 
 
There is somewhat less controversy surrounding the design of a compliance system for enforcing the 
Kyoto Protocol. The EU and small island states wanted strict sanctions in case of non-compliance with 
the Protocol. The USA and Canada wanted milder sanctions. 
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5.6 Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. 
When discussing emission reductions, the focus has primarily been on reducing the consumption of 
fossil fuels. But Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) activities are also important. 
Estimates show that LULUCF activities have contributed to about 30% of the increase in the CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere. This is primarily a result of land-use changes and deforestation in 
tropical areas. But the forest is also important as a sink as it houses about half of the carbon stored in 
terrestrial ecosystems. The potential for cheap emissions reductions within LULUCF activities is 
large, and it could to some extent protect the tropical forests. The uncertainty connected with 
LULUCF activities is also large, and there is some fear that such activities could undermine the aim of 
reducing emissions from fossil fuels in Annex I countries. Slide 5.9 describes the most important 
articles in the Kyoto Protocol concerning LULUCF activities. 
 
• Article 2.1 encourages Annex I countries to protect or increase their sinks. This includes 
promotion of sustainable forest management, afforestation, and reforestation. 
• Article 3.3 states that net changes in GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks as a 
result of direct human-induced land-use change and forestry, limited to afforestation, 
reforestation, and deforestation since 1990 shall be included in the national climate accounts. 
• Article 3.4 states that the COP shall decide upon modalities, rules and guidance as to how, and 
which, additional human-induced activities within LULUCF can be included (for instance 
activities related to agriculture). 
• Article 6.1 encompasses Joint Implementation, which opens for emission reduction units 
resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing 
anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHG in any sector of the economy. 
 
Slide 5.9. Articles in the Kyoto Protocol concerning LULUCF 
Articles in the Kyoto Protocol 
concerning LULUCF
Article 2.1 promotion of sustainable forest management, 
afforestation and reforestation.
Article 3.3 afforestation, reforestation and deforestation 
activities since 1990
Article 3.4 additional human-induced activities within 
LULUCF can be included.
Article 6.1 Joint Implementation through enhancing 
anthropogenic removals by sinks
Source: CICERO
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The treatment of LULUCF projects for project-level mitigation under Article 12 on the CDM remains 
debated. This is to a large extent based on the text in the Kyoto Protocol, as Article 12 has no explicit 
mention of “source” or “sink.” Some claim that since there is no explicit reference to LULUCF 
activities, they are not included. But given the broad coverage of forestry activities in other articles in 
the Kyoto Protocol, it seems unlikely that it was intentionally left out of Article 12. 
 
Slide 5.10. Challenges/difficulties concerning LULUCF 
Challenges/difficulties 
concerning LULUCF
Difficulties in measuring and verify carbon sequestration
The issue of permanence
Increased land conflicts
Problem of leakage
Environmental effects
Source: CICERO
 
 
One of the problems of including LULUCF activities in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is 
that the Protocol lacks vital definitions of what forests, afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation 
are. A special report from the IPCC on LULUCF was completed in the spring of 2000 to aid decision-
makers on such issues. But the problems and challenges of including LULUCF activities do not stop 
there. Slide 5.10 highlights some of these other main difficulties. 
 
• How should the carbon sequestration be measured and verified? The uncertainties in 
measuring such change are large, especially concerning the carbon content in roots and the 
soil. 
 
• The issue of permanence is vital, as the forest in principle should stand forever if its emission 
reductions are to be considered permanent. This is easier in the energy sector because reduced 
emission one year does not imply higher emissions at a later stage. This cannot be guaranteed 
for LULUCF activities because the accumulated carbon can be released as a result of, e.g., 
changing ownership, government policies, climatic factors, and fires.    
 
• Measures within forestry, such as tree plantations or national parks, can lead to additional 
conflict. Such forest areas will be tied up for a long time, thus reducing the alternative uses 
significantly.   
 
• Another possible problem is the issue of leakage. Protecting one area can lead to increased 
pressure in a different area. If this other area is deforested, the net climate effect could be zero. 
 
• Tree plantations can come in conflict with, e.g., the Biodiversity Convention. The 
environmental effects of such activities must therefore be considered. 
Some concern has been expressed over the possibility that LULUCF activities may come in conflict 
with other agreements, for instance the Biodiversity Convention. Obviously, not every “forest” project 
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considered for its carbon benefits will be able to deliver the same amount of socio-economic and other 
environmental benefits. In fact, some previous attempts to reduce forest loss have led to unanticipated 
adverse effects. Financial incentives offered to encourage reforestation in Costa Rica prompted some 
landowners to cut down native forests to clear land for new trees. Foresters in Chile have been 
criticized for planting radiata pine over large areas without diversifying to other species, and for 
making room for plantations by removing existing native forests (Goldberg, 1999). 
 
It is clear that the issue of LULUCF activities represents several challenges, and it is one of the 
unresolved “crunch” issues in climate negotiations. LULUCF activities have a central part in the 
second proposal issued by Mr. Pronk (the second Pronk paper). It is especially Article 3.4 that has led 
to heated discussions as to what additional human-induced activities within LULUCF can be included. 
Mr. Pronk suggests a “three-tiered” proposal for accounting under Article 3.4 LULUCF activities that 
seeks to strike a balance between several considerations (including quality of sinks and scientific 
basis). The proposal states that Parties that choose to make use of the provisions of Article 3.4 must 
adhere to the following: 
• First tier. Forest management credited 100% up to the level of Article 3.3 debit, with a cap of 30 
Mt CO2 times five, if total managed forest since 1990 compensates for this debit. 
• Second tier. Forest management beyond first tier – apply 85% discount. 
• Third tier. Agricultural management (cropland management, grazing land management, and 
revegetation): apply “net-net” accounting compared to the base year level (i.e. carbon stock 
changes in the commitment period minus five times the carbon stock changes in the base year).  
 
Mr. Pronk further suggests some boundary conditions for LULUCF accounting for the first 
commitment period.  
• The sum total of: 
1. the second and third tier under Article 3.4; and 
2. emissions reduction units (ERUs) resulting from LULUCF project activities under Article 
6; and 
3. certified emissions reductions (CERs) resulting from LULUCF project activities under 
Article 12; is not to exceed 50% of a Party’s emission reduction target, for Annex I 
• is not to exceed 50% of a Party’s emission reduction target, for Annex I Parties whose Kyoto 
target in Annex B is less than 100 (i.e. 0.5 x ((100-Kyoto target)/100) x base year emissions x 5, 
and   
• is not to exceed 2.5 % of a Party’s base year emission times 5, for Annex I Parties whose Kyoto 
target in Annex B is equal to or greater than, 100. 
 
5.7 Capacity building in developing countries 
Capacity building in developing countries is regarded as very important as it is a way of including 
developing countries. The framework for capacity building activities was negotiated at COP6 based on 
a text forwarded to the COP by the subsidiary bodies at their thirteenth session. The framework sets 
out the scope and provides the basis for action on capacity building. The objective of capacity-building 
is to assist developing countries in building, developing, strengthening, enhancing, and improving 
their capabilities to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC through the implementation of the 
provisions of the Convention and the preparation for their effective participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
process. There are several guiding principles and approaches for the framework. The framework is 
guided and informed by a number of articles in the Convention (articles 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 and 
others) and in the Kyoto Protocol (articles 10c, 10d, 10e and 11). Capacity building activities should 
build on work already undertaken by developing countries, as well as on the work undertaken with 
support from multilateral and bilateral organizations. The capacity building needs already identified 
should continue to be comprehensively and promptly addressed to promote sustainable development. 
Capacity building must be country-driven, addressing the specific needs and conditions of developing 
countries and reflecting their sustainable development strategies, priorities, and initiatives. Capacity 
building is a continuous, progressive and iterative process, the implementation of which should be 
based on the priorities of developing countries. It should be undertaken in an effective, efficient, 
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integrated and programmatic manner, taking into consideration the specific national circumstances of 
developing countries. 
The least developed countries and small island states are among the most vulnerable to extreme 
weather events and the adverse effects of climate change. They are particularly vulnerable as they also 
have the least capacity to cope with and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The needs and 
priority areas for capacity building in these countries include the following (UNFCC, 2000): 
 
a) Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing new national climate change 
secretariats or focal points; 
 
b) Developing an integrated implementation program that takes into account the role of research 
and training in capacity building; 
 
c) Developing and enhancing technical capacities and skills to carry out and effectively integrate 
vulnerability and adaptation assessments into sustainable development programs; 
 
d) Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing new national research and training 
institutions; 
 
e) Strengthening the capacity of meteorological and hydrological services; 
 
f) Enhancing public awareness. 
 
5.8 Reporting systems 
The issue of reporting is not controversial in the climate negotiations, and it seems that agreement will 
be reached fairly easily. In accordance with articles 4 and 12 of the Convention, Parties are to submit 
to the secretariat national greenhouse gas inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. These inventory data 
are provided in the national communications under the Convention by Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. In addition, Annex I Parties submit annual national greenhouse gas inventories with data for 
their base year (in most cases 1990) and up to the second to last year prior to the year of submission. 
 
Starting in 2000, Annex I Parties must follow the revised UNFCCC reporting guidelines, adopted at 
COP5, in preparing their inventories.  According to these guidelines, Annex I Parties must use a 
common reporting format for reporting their annual greenhouse gas data. Also at COP5, Parties 
adopted, for a two-year trial period covering the inventory submissions due in 2000 and 2001, 
guidelines for the technical review of the greenhouse gas inventories submitted by Annex I Parties.  
5.9 Enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol 
A compliance system is required to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol can be enforced. The Parties must 
be monitored to certify that they honor their commitments to the Protocol in accordance with the rules 
adopted for the Kyoto mechanisms. So far, the Parties have agreed to establish a Compliance 
Committee comprising two branches, one facilitative branch and one enforcement branch, see Slide 
5.11.  
 
The tasks of the facilitative branch are to give assistance to individual Parties and make 
recommendations on questions of implementation, in particular with reference to minimizing adverse 
effects from actions taken and from climate change impacts on other Parties, especially developing 
country Parties, estimation and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, demonstration of compliance, 
reporting of measures to mitigate climate change, transfer of technologies to developing countries, 
climate research, education and training programs, and provision of additional financial resources to 
developing countries to meet their commitments under the Climate Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol. There is a provision for an expedited procedure with respect to the Kyoto mechanisms. 
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With a reference to the Kyoto targets and requirements for the Kyoto mechanisms, the tasks of the 
enforcement branch are to assess non-compliance and decide on questions of implementation that can 
potentially lead to application of adjustments and sanctions. 
 
The second Pronk paper suggests that the two branches of the Compliance Committee comprise one 
member from each of the five UN regional groups, one member from the group of small island states, 
two members from Annex I countries, and two members from non-Annex I countries, altogether 10 
representatives. Decisions are to be made by consensus. If consensus is not possible, there should be a 
three-fourths majority vote. Furthermore the paper proposes that excess emissions from a Party’s 
assigned amount can be subtracted in the subsequent commitment period with a penalty rate added. 
The penalty rate is a type of interest rate for delays that give Parties incentives to comply. The penalty 
rate is set at 1.1 for exceeding assigned emissions by less than 1% for the subsequent commitment 
period (which means that the excess emissions must be covered by an additional 10% reduction), to be 
increased to 1.5 for exceeding emissions by between 1% and 8%, and 2.0 for exceeding emissions by 
8% or more. A Party not in compliance must provide a compliance action plan explaining how to meet 
the commitments in the subsequent period, to be approved by the enforcement branch. A Party that is 
not able to satisfactorily demonstrate that it has a surplus in terms of meeting the national Kyoto target 
and the methodological and reporting requirements for the Kyoto mechanisms can have its eligibility 
to transfer and acquire emissions suspended. With respect to the CDM, there will be no eligibility 
requirements for developing countries. Mr. Pronk favors the adoption of a formal agreement on 
compliance that supplements the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Slide 5.11. Proposed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol 
Proposed compliance system for 
the Kyoto Protocol
• Compliance Committee with: 
- Facilitative branch
- Enforcement branch
• The second Pronk paper proposal for sanctions in case of 
non-compliance: subtraction of excess emissions in 
subsequent commitment period:
– Penalty rate of 1.1 if excess emissions are less than 1% of 
assigned amount (excess emissions plus 10%)
– Penalty rate of 1.5 if excess emissions are between 1% and 
8% of assigned amount
– Penalty rate of 2.0 if excess emissions are 8% or more of 
assigned amount
Source: CICERO
 
 
6. The status of the Parties’ negotiation positions 
after the meeting in The Hague  
6.1 Factors determining countries’ positions 
To understand the different countries’ positions in the climate negotiations, one has to consider a 
number of factors. Some countries may not be clear on where they stand because they are uncertain of 
how they stand to gain or lose from the Kyoto Protocol. But a country can also be reluctant to take 
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positions for tactical reasons. Generally speaking, the many types of uncertainties concerning both 
costs and benefits from measures of reducing GHG emissions will make clear positions more difficult. 
The most important factors determining a country’s position in climate negotiations are shown in Slide 
6.1. 
 
Slide 6.1. Factors determining countries’ positions 
Factors determining 
countries’ positions
• Expected costs of reducing the GHG emissions in the country. Such 
costs will depend on a number of factors, including economic 
structure and trade patterns, energy system, energy efficiency, the 
extent to which measures have been implemented, and the specific
details of the Kyoto Protocol.
• Expected costs of future climate changes in the country.
• Positions of other countries. It will be easier to get a country to 
stretch further if it expects other countries to do likewise. However, 
the benefits of free riding when other countries implement measures 
can be large.
• Political conditions and culture/lifestyle in the country. One example 
is the US resistance against taxes in environmental policies and other 
areas.
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
Slide 6.2 gives another perspective on countries and groups of countries’ positions in international 
climate policy negotiations. The countries are divided along two dimensions, where the first is 
vulnerability to climate change impacts, and the second is costs associated with climate policy 
measures. Along both dimensions, a country’s anticipated vulnerability can be just as important as cost 
estimates. The Parties are divided into three main groups similar to the negotiations leading up to the 
Kyoto Protocol, “the Umbrella Group", “EU and friends", and G77/China. The “Umbrella Group” 
comprises Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
and the United States. “EU and friends” comprise, in addition to the EU, Switzerland and 8 Central 
and East European Countries (CEE). There seems to be a good correlation between the positions 
countries have chosen in the negotiations and their anticipated vulnerability to climate change impacts 
and to estimated national costs related to climate policy measures (see Slide 6.2). 
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Slide 6.2. Interests of countries according to degree of vulnerability to climate change impacts 
and to climate policy costs 
Interests of countries according to degree of vulnerability 
to climate change impacts and to climate policy costs
Vulnerability to climate change 
impacts*
Less vulnerable to climate change 
impacts
Vulnerable to climate change 
impacts
Costs due to climate policy 
measures
Low costs USA
EU
Most of “umbrella” group
[Ambitious targets if high concern about 
climate change]
AOSIS
Most of G77/China
[Ambitious targets, but industrialized 
countries must take the first steps]
High costs Norway
[Ambitious targets if high concern about 
climate change, but realizes this will be 
costly]
OPEC
[Slow down policy measures; more 
concerned about cost of measures than 
cost of climate change impacts]
* Note that AOSIS-countries and OPEC-countries are members of G77/China, and that USA and Norway are members of 
the umbrella group (AOSIS is the Alliance of Small Island States).
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
 
6.2 The positions of the most important Parties  
Slide 6.3 shows some Parties’ positions on supplementarity with respect to the Kyoto mechanisms 
(emissions trading, JI, and the CDM), and on sinks. The EU and most developing countries supported 
a strict interpretation of the requirement that trading with the Kyoto mechanisms shall be supplemental 
to domestic mitigation actions. As mentioned above, the EU proposed a quantified capping on buying 
and selling quotas. The Umbrella Group – which includes the USA, Canada, Japan and Norway – 
wanted a soft interpretation of supplementarity and no capping on trade. In terms of sinks, the USA, 
Canada and Japan wanted soft rules, implying that a large volume of carbon sequestration from 
forestry, agriculture practices, and land use changes could be credited toward the Kyoto targets, 
whereas the EU, Norway and most developing countries favored stricter rules for inclusion of sinks, at 
least for the first Kyoto period 2008–12. 
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Slide 6.3. Some Parties’ positions on sinks and supplementary related to the Kyoto 
mechanisms 
Some Parties’ positions on 
sinks and supplementarity
Strict
Soft Strict
Sinks
Supplementarity
G77/China
NorwayUSA, Canada, Japan
EU
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
There is also disagreement on sanctions in case of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
commitments. The EU and the small island states wanted strict sanctions in the form of fees, whereas 
the USA and Canada wanted milder sanctions. 
 
In terms of funding mechanisms and capacity building in developing countries, Mr. Pronk proposed 
the establishment of an adaptation fund and a convention fund. The adaptation fund would be financed 
by a share of proceeds on the CDM equal to 2% of the CDM credits generated by a project. The other 
fund would be financed through a not yet specified transfer of the initial assigned amount to OECD 
countries (Annex II) to the registry of the fund. These units can be bought by industrialized countries 
as part of emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The developing countries 
(G77/China) in their comments to Mr. Pronk’s paper propose that a much higher share of the CDM 
credits generated by a project should finance the adaptation fund, namely 9%. This group of countries 
furthermore proposes that the convention fund be named “the Special Fund” and be managed by a UN 
specialized body, such as UNEP, instead of the GEF. The total funding of these funds should by year 
2005 reach one billon USD annually as an average for the period 2000–2005 to avoid applying a levy 
on emissions trading and JI. 
6.3 Reasons for different emissions within the OECD countries 
There are large variations in how much CO2 the industrialized countries emit, both relative to 
population numbers and income level (i.e. gross domestic product). It is clear that energy is utilized 
more efficiently in the OECD countries compared to former communist countries. The emissions per 
capita are not higher than in these former communist countries, despite income levels being much 
higher in the OECD countries. Slide 6.4 shows the carbon emissions in some countries relative to 
GDP. It is clear that the carbon intensities (carbon emissions divided by GDP) have decreased 
significantly in some countries. France, Norway, and Sweden have nearly halved their carbon 
intensities from 1973 to 1993/95. Countries such as Australia, Canada and Denmark have also reduced 
their carbon intensities, but not to the same extent as the countries mentioned above. 
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Slide 6.4. Carbon emissions in some OECD countries 
Carbon emissions in some OECD countries 
Carbon emissions in IEA countries, normalised to GDP 
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 Source: Schipper et. Al (2000) 
 
Australia’s high CO2 emissions can partly be explained by energy-intensive sectors, such as the 
chemical industry and production of iron, steel and non-iron metals. Another factor is that nearly all 
electricity in Australia is produced by coal-fired power plants. Australia also has a large transport 
sector. 
 
The high CO2 emissions in Canada and the USA can also be explained by the high energy 
consumption in the transport sector. The generally high income levels combined with low taxes on 
energy consumption can account for the large emissions. The energy consumption in the transport 
sector is especially high, as the taxes on fuels are very low. Canada has a very energy intensive 
industry sector, the main sectors being chemical industry and paper industry. The US industry is not as 
energy intensive as the Canadian industry, but the USA still has higher CO2 emissions than Canada. 
This is because over 50% of the electricity in the USA is produced by coal-fired power plants. 
Canada’s power production on the other hand, is based mainly on hydropower and coal is less 
important. 
 
Both Norway and Sweden have high energy consumption per capita, but still relatively low emissions 
of CO2. The most important explanation for this is the hydropower-based power sector in these 
countries, and nuclear power in Sweden. The UK and Germany do not have a particular energy 
intensive industry structure. An explanation for their relatively high emissions is that over half of their 
electricity production is from coal-fired power plants. Oil, gas and nuclear power are important for 
Japanese energy production. Nuclear power has an important role in France. Approximately 80% of 
the electricity is France is based on nuclear power plants, whereas 14% is based on hydropower. 
6.4 Distribution of global CO2 emissions 
The Kyoto Protocol acknowledges the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries as they 
account for the bulk of atmospheric build-up of CO2 concentrations. The previous slide showed that 
carbon intensities vary between countries. Slide 6.5 shows that the CO2 emissions per capita also vary 
sustantially, especially if developed countries are compared to developing countries. The North 
American OECD countries (the USA and Canada) have emissions close to 20 tons CO2 per capita. 
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Corresponding figures for Latin America, Africa and South Asia are 2.4, 1.0 and 0.7 tons CO2 per 
capita. The 5% of the global population living in the USA and Canada, account for more than 25% of 
the global carbon emissions. China, on the other hand, accounts for about one-fifth of the global 
population, but only 14% of global carbon emissions.  
 
Slide 6.5. Carbon emissions related to population size, 1995 
Carbon emissions related to population size, 1995
Source: IEA (1998)
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6.5 Emission reduction costs  
A number of options can be adopted in response to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere. These options include (i) measures to eliminate or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
and ii) measures to offset emissions, for instance through the enhancement of sinks. There have been 
numerous studies on the costs of reducing CO2 emissions, and the estimates span over a wide range. 
Some studies estimate losses at several percent of GDP, whereas others question whether there will be 
any losses at all. Significant differences and uncertainties surround specific quantitative estimates of 
the costs of mitigation options. The possible explanations for disagreement are many: choice of 
methodologies, underlying assumptions, emission scenarios, policy instruments, base year, and others. 
The SAR described two categories of approaches to estimating costs: bottom-up approaches, which 
build on assessments of specific technologies and sectors, and top-down modeling studies, which 
proceed from macroeconomic relationships. These two approaches lead to differences in the estimates 
of costs, which have been narrowed since the SAR. Even if these differences were resolved, other 
uncertainties would remain (See Slide 6.6). 
 
The cost estimates for Annex B countries to implement the Kyoto Protocol vary between studies and 
regions, and depend strongly upon the assumptions regarding the use of the Kyoto mechanisms and 
their interactions with domestic measures. The great majority of global studies reporting and 
comparing these costs use international energy-economic models. Nine of these studies suggest the 
following GDP impacts: 
 
1) Annex II countries: In the absence of emissions trading among Annex B countries, the 
majority of global studies show reductions in projected GDP of about 0.2 to 2% in 2010 for 
different Annex II regions. With full emissions trading among Annex B countries, the estimated 
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reductions in 2010 are between 0.1 and 1.1% of projected GDP. Models whose results are 
referred to here assume full use of emissions trading without transaction cost. Results for cases 
that do not allow Annex B trading assume full domestic trading within each region. Models do 
not include sinks or non-CO2 greenhouse gases. They do not include the CDM, negative cost 
options, ancillary benefits, or targeted revenue recycling. 
 
The models show that the Kyoto mechanisms are important in controlling risks of high costs in a 
number of countries, and thus can complement domestic policy mechanisms. Similarly, they can 
minimize risks of inequitable international impacts and help to level marginal costs. The global 
modeling studies reported above show national marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto targets ranging 
from about US$20/tC up to US$600/tC without trading, and from about US$15/tC up to US$150/tC 
with Annex B trading. The cost reductions from these mechanisms may depend on the details of 
implementation, including the compatibility of domestic and international mechanisms, constraints, 
and transaction costs. 
 
2) Economies in transition: For most of these countries, GDP effects range from negligible to a 
several percent increase. This reflects opportunities for energy efficiency improvements not 
available to Annex II countries. Under assumptions of significant energy efficiency improvements 
and/or continuing economic recessions in some countries, the assigned amounts may exceed 
projected emissions in the first commitment period. In this case, models show increased GDP due 
to revenues from trading assigned amounts. However, for some economies in transition, 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol will have similar a impact on GDP as for Annex II countries. 
 
Slide 6.6. Emissions reduction costs 
Emission reduction costs
• Options that eliminate or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and 
options that offset emissions, for instance through the enhancement 
of sinks.
• Bottom-up approaches and top-down modeling studies.
• Numerous studies and the cost estimates span over a wide range.
• The range of cost estimates has been narrowed since the SAR.
• The cost estimates for Annex B countries depend strongly on the 
assumptions regarding the use of the Kyoto mechanisms, and their
interactions with domestic measures.
• In the absence of emissions trade among Annex B countries, the 
majority of global studies show reductions in projected GDP of about 
0.2 to 2% in 2010 for different Annex II regions. 
• With full emissions trading among Annex B countries, the estimated 
reductions in 2010 are between 0.1 and 1.1% of projected GDP.
Source: IPCC (2001c)
 
 
 
6.6 The Kyoto Protocol and the fossil fuel markets 
To the extent that international environmental agreements seek to lower emissions related to energy 
use, which is the case for the Kyoto Protocol, their implementation affects energy markets and prices. 
The fossil fuel markets are especially interesting as emissions of carbon dioxide, and thereby 
combustion of fossil fuels, have to be reduced. Bartsch and Müller (2000), Holtsmark and Mæstad 
(2000), and Kolshus et al. (2000), among others, have shown that implementation of the Kyoto 
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Protocol is likely to have significant impacts on the fossil fuel markets and energy prices. The results 
from such studies will naturally vary according to different assumptions on central issues such as 
choice of policy tools, the use of the Kyoto mechanisms, technological development, and modeling 
techniques. The effects after the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period are more uncertain because 
decisions concerning ambition level of emissions reductions and country participation must be made.13 
 
The study by Holtsmark and Mæstad (2000) applies a numerical model of the fossil fuel markets and 
includes a global oil market, a global coal market, and three regional gas markets (North America, 
Asia, and Europe including Russia). The model should be considered as an analytical tool that can be 
used to obtain information about important mechanisms and some orders of magnitudes. However, it 
is not intended as a forecasting device. The consequences for the fossil fuel markets depend on the 
policies that are employed to reach the emission targets. Particular attention is devoted to the role of 
international emissions trading. Three different trading regimes are compared: free emissions trading, 
no emissions trading, and the EU proposal on limits on the acquisition and transfer of emission 
permits. Some of the key findings are described below and summarized in Slide 6.7. 
 
• The Kyoto Protocol will significantly reduce coal demand, but it will not lead to very large 
reductions in oil and gas demand. In the industrialized countries, coal demand is reduced by 
some 34–44%, oil demand by 5–7%, and gas demand by 2–3% (relative to the business-as-
usual scenario for 2010). 
 
• Demand reductions are generally smaller with free international emissions trading, because 
substantial amounts of hot air then will be released on the market. 
 
• Emissions trading generally leads to more abatement in Eastern Europe and less abatement in 
North America.  
 
• The EU capping proposal will be non-binding for buyers of emission permits, but will 
significantly constrain the sale of emissions permits from Eastern Europe. The amount of hot 
air released on the market is reduced by some 65%. 
 
• The EU capping proposal causes a rise in the international permit price from 15 to 23 USD per 
ton CO2. 
 
• There is less substitution from oil to gas in Western Europe than in other regions. While oil 
demand in Western Europe declines by 4–6%, gas demand is reduced by 4–8%.  
 
• Western Europe is a net importer of emission permits with low permit prices (free trade) and a 
net exporter with high permit prices (the EU proposal). Thus, a gradual “liberalization” of 
international emission trading might first lead to lower fuel demand, then to higher fuel 
demand in Western Europe.  
 
• The producer prices of fossil fuels do not fall dramatically. The coal price falls by 7–9%, the 
oil price drops by 2–3%, while the European gas price falls by 3–5%. Oil and gas prices 
decline most without emissions trading because less hot air then is released on the market. See 
Slide 6.8 for details on the impacts on producer prices in 2010 under three different cases: free 
emissions trading, no emissions trading, and trading within limits.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 See for instance Kolshus et al. (2000). 
14
 “Trading within limits” is identical with the EU capping proposal described in chapter 5.5. 
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Slide 6.7. Key findings from a study on the Kyoto Protocol and the fossil fuel markets 
Key findings of a study on the Kyoto 
Protocol and the fossil fuels markets
• Significant reductions in coal demand, less impact on oil 
and gas demand.
• Demand reductions are generally smaller with free 
international emission trading.
• Emissions trading generally leads to more abatement in 
Eastern Europe and less abatement in North America.
• The EU capping proposal increases the international 
permit price from 15 to 23 USD per ton CO2.
• Producer prices of fossil fuels do not fall dramatically.
Source: Holtsmark and Mæstad (2000)
 
 
 
Slide 6.8. Impacts on the producer prices in 2010 
Impacts on producer prices in 2010
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7. National and regional initiatives 
 
This chapter presents an overview of national and regional climate policy measures with a focus on 
emissions trading initiatives. In addition, climate policies and measures within the EU and green 
certificates to stimulate renewable energy sources are mentioned. 
7.1 National emissions trading systems 
 
Norway 
In October 1998, a Quota Commission for Norway was appointed as part of a political compromise at 
the Norwegian parliament to propose a domestic emissions trading system for Norway. The idea was 
to design a domestic emissions trading system that would be an important part of implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol in Norway from year 2008. According to the mandate for the commission, the system 
should at least encompass sectors that are exempted from the carbon tax, but consider how the 
remaining sectors could be included in the system. The commission should emphasize quota allocation 
criteria. The report was finalized in December 1999.15 The main features of the report are shown in 
Slide 7.1. 
 
Slide 7.1. Main features of the domestic emissions trading system for Norway proposed by the 
Quota Commission 
Main features of the domestic emissions trading system 
for Norway proposed by the Quota Commission.
1. A broad domestic system including 90% of emissions of the six 
Kyoto greenhouse gases.
2. Quota obligations from 2008 as part of implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol.
3. Sinks for carbon dioxide are included.
4. Quotas can be banked and freely used within the period.
5. Firms must pay the full market price for quotas (minority view that 
most quotas should be free).
6. If free quotas are used, their sale should be restricted.
7. New firms must buy all the quotas they need.
8. The obligation to obtain quotas can be on producers, distributors, or 
consumers.
9.      All agents should be allowed to participate in international emissions 
trading.
Source: CICERO.
 
 
 
The Quota Commission stated that emissions trading could be combined with carbon taxes at the 
domestic level, but that a domestic quota system could easily be linked to international emissions 
trading. The remaining 10% of greenhouse gas emissions would be too difficult and costly to include 
in the quota system. 
 
A majority of 6 members of the committee recommended that all firms pay full market price for 
quotas according to the Polluter Pays Principle. A minority of 2 members of the committee 
recommended that firms that are exempted from the carbon tax should receive free quotas, whereas a 
                                                     
15
 NOU 2000:1. 
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different minority of 2 members of the committee argued that allocation of free quotas was outside the 
mandate of the commission. The commission furthermore proposed that if free quotas are allocated, 
some of these should be non-tradable such that the firm that received those quotas can only use them. 
A majority of 6 felt that free quotas would reduce the danger of some firms going out of business due 
to climate policy. On the other hand, non-tradable quotas would reduce incentives to make production 
more effective and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. A minority of 5 therefore proposed that 
some of the free quotas should be tradable to improve incentives for abating emissions. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden appointed an expert commission to produce a report on the use of the Kyoto mechanisms in 
Sweden. The report was finalized in April 2000. The report describes a domestic emissions trading 
system with many features comparable to the Norwegian proposal, but where the system should be 
introduced before year 2008, and with an opening for trading with other countries and using JI before 
2008. After a second phase of the expert commission’s work, which was initiated when the EU 
released its “Green paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union” (see 
section 7.2), a final report was produced that proposed a much more limited domestic emissions 
trading system that resembles the EU’s proposal. The main features of the final report are shown in 
Slide 7.2. 
 
Slide 7.2. Main features of a proposed domestic emissions trading system for Sweden 
Main features of a proposed domestic
emissions trading system for Sweden.
1. The system covers energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in 
transport, households, and industries that are not exposed to 
competition from abroad.
2. Industries that are paying less than the full carbon tax are exempted 
until 2008.
3. The quotas are auctioned and replace present carbon taxes.
4. There should be tough sanctions on non-justified emissions.
5. JI and the CDM can be employed.
6. Sinks are not included.
7.      The European Economic Cooperation-countries (of which Norway is 
one) are allowed to participate in emissions trading within the EU.
Source: CICERO.
 
 
 
Denmark 
A quota system for the Danish electricity-producing sector was introduced in the spring of 2000. 
Carbon dioxide quotas are allocated for free based on historical emissions. The quotas can be traded 
with other countries. A tax equal to 40 DKK per ton of carbon dioxide is levied on emissions that 
surpass available quotas.  
 
The United Kingdom 
The British industry established an Emission Trading Group in 1999 that includes representatives from 
industry and the government. The group recommended an emissions trading system as an alternative 
to a climate tax intended for introduction in April 2001. The aim of the emissions trading proposal is 
to achieve the British climate target in cost-effective manner and keep British industries from losing 
their competitive edge compared to other countries. The system should induce more firms to take on 
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an active role and produce trading experience that will later prove valuable. The proposal contains 
details on allocation of quotas and rules that secure fairness, transparency, monitoring, and 
verification. The aim is to have the system operative from April 1, 2001. 
7.2 Emissions trading within the EU 
The EU has proposed an emissions trading system within the union in its “Green Paper on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union” to be established by 2005. The system only 
covers CO2 emissions from the energy sector, the iron and steel industry, refineries, chemical industry, 
glass, ceramics and building materials, and paper and pulp, which altogether accounted for about 45% 
of the EU’s CO2 emissions in 1997. The other five greenhouse gases from the Kyoto protocol are 
completely excluded from the system. Such a limited system is simple but realistic since member 
states are at very different levels in implementing climate policies. The system should be flexible such 
that member states can choose to participate or not, and have the option to later leave the system for a 
period. A major concern for the EU is to harmonize market conditions in different member states to 
achieve a “level playing field.” Because of this, the emissions trading system must be supplemented 
with other measures in non-participating sectors. Possible measures in these sectors include command 
and control, technical minimum standards, taxes, or voluntary agreements. Different quota allocations 
options are discussed, such as whether quotas should be free or auctioned, whether each member state 
should allocate the quotas, or whether this should be a task for the EU, but these issues remain 
unresolved.  
7.3 Other climate policy initiatives 
 
EU policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions 
The European Commission has acknowledged that actions by both member states and the European 
Community need to be reinforced if the EU is to succeed in reducing its emissions of GHGs by 2008–
2012. The Commission launched in June 2000 the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), the 
goal of which is to identify and develop all the necessary elements of an EU strategy to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol. The ECCP is preparing a range of additional EU-level policies and measures to cut 
GHG emissions as well as an emissions trading scheme. The focus is on the energy, transport, and 
industry sectors, but the scope may be broadened later to encompass sectors such as agriculture, 
forestry, and waste. Some of the proposed policies and measures on climate change are as shown 
below. 
Energy sector 
- Increased use of combined heat and power 
- Capture and disposal of CO2 in underground reservoirs 
- Promotion of more efficient and cleaner fossil fuel conversion technologies 
- Energy efficiency in the electricity and gas supply industries 
- Improvement of building/lighting efficiency  
- Public procurement of energy-efficient end-use technologies 
Industrial sector 
- Improvement in energy efficiency standards for electrical equipment 
- Improvement in efficiency standards for industrial processes 
- Development of an EC-wide policy framework for emissions trading 
- Development of a framework for voluntary agreements 
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Transport sector 
- Improved emission and fuel standards, new technologies and fuels 
- European campaign for more fuel-efficient driver-behavior 
- Transport pricing and economic instruments for aviation 
The EU has initiated several programs as part of its policies and measures approach. Some examples 
of these programs are shown below. 
1. The Campaign for Take-Off will run for 5 years, from 1999 to 2003, and is meant to act as a 
catalyst for the development of key renewable sectors. 
2. ALTENER is the EU non-technological program aimed at promoting the use of renewable 
energy sources within the Union.  
3. The SAVE (Specific Action for Vigorous Energy Efficiency) took a non-technological 
approach to energy efficiency, complementing existing technology-based programs. This 
initiative has been extended with SAVE II.  
4. THERMIE is a demonstration component of the Non-Nuclear RTD Program and supports the 
demonstration and application of innovative energy technologies and provides for the 
enhanced dissemination of information. 
Green certificates 
Green certificates are a new policy tool aimed at increasing the share of renewables in electricity 
production. Instead of regulating producers, the electricity consumers are obliged to use a minimum 
share of renewables. Since renewables at the outset are not competitive with conventional electricity 
production, this is comparable to levying a tax on electricity consumption. In political terms this seems 
to be less controversial than paying large subsidies to, for instance, new windmills. This share is likely 
to increase over time. An efficient market for supplying different renewable energy sources can be 
established through green certificates, but the total electricity supply market will not be efficient due to 
the direct regulation of a minimum share of renewables, regardless of a higher production price for 
this “green” electricity. A physical market for electricity is combined with a financial market for green 
certificates. Green certificates are issued to the producers of renewable energy by a certification 
authority according to production. In the physical market, there is only one price for electricity, but 
consumers also have to buy green certificates equivalent to the specified percentage of their electricity 
use. An authority is given the responsibility of verifying that the commitments of the consumers are 
met. Demand and supply in the certificate market generates the price of green certificates. Transaction 
costs can be saved if the distributors of electricity take on the task of meeting the percentage share of 
renewables, and add the additional cost to the electricity bills of consumers. The price of the 
certificates can vary significantly due to variability in the production of for example wind energy. 
 
A variant of green certificates called “Green labels” was introduced in the Netherlands in 1998 with 
the aim of increasing the share of renewables from 3.2% in 2000 to 10% by 2020. Under this system, 
consumers buy green electricity at a higher price directly from producers, and no electricity exchange 
is involved. The Netherlands has plans to transform this system into a system with green certificates. 
There are plans to introduce green certificates in Denmark with the aim of increasing the share of 
renewables to 20% by 2003. Today the share of wind energy is 9%, and other renewables account for 
1–2%. In addition there are plans to introduce green certificates within the EU  
 
Green certificates differ from emissions trading since they only aim at increasing the share of 
renewables. However, this policy tool may be part of a strategy to implement the Kyoto Protocol since 
expansion of renewable energy production can save consumption of fossil fuels. Renewable energy 
projects both achieve more “green” electricity production and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
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7.4 Norwegian climate policy 
According to the latest projections, Norwegian emissions of climate gases will increase by 24% from 
1990 until 2010. The sectors that contribute most to this growth are oil and gas production and 
transportation. Norway’s Kyoto target is +1% compared to 1990. This means that Norway has to 
reduce its expected 2010 emissions by around 12 Mt CO2-equivalents. If the plans for five gas-fired 
power plants are realized, projected climate gas emissions will increase by up to 7 Mt CO2-
equivalents. Thus up to 19 Mt CO2-equivalents must be reduced compared to business as usual in 2010 
to meet the Kyoto target. 
 
These reductions must be carried out domestically or by employing emissions trading or JI with other 
industrialized countries, or the CDM with developing countries. The Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority has produced an inventory of abatement measures and ranked them according to increasing 
cost per ton of CO2 equivalent (SFT, 2000). This marginal abatement cost curve shows that about 11 
Mt CO2 can be abated for a price that is less than the highest carbon tax at present, which is a tax of 
406 NOK per ton of CO2 on gasoline. Thereafter the marginal cost increases steeply. Assuming a 
quota price of 15 USD per ton of CO2-equivalent at the international market, equivalent to around 140 
NOK per ton of CO2-equivalent, Norway should abate 5 Mt CO2 domestically and buy 7 Mt CO2 
quotas at the international market to minimize its cost of meeting the Kyoto target. If all gas-fired 
power plants are built, quotas of 14 Mt CO2-equivalents must be bought on the international market. 
This shows that Norway is dependent on buying a substantial amount of quotas from other countries, 
and particularly so if gas-fired power plants are built and their emissions have to be accounted for. 
Furthermore, this shows the importance of a well-functioning market for the Kyoto mechanisms with 
as few restrictions as possible and low transaction costs, to make the quota cost as low as possible and 
reduce the Norwegian implementation cost of the Kyoto target. Slide 7.3 illustrates the potential cost 
saving of free quota trade through some results from a study by Kolshus, Torvanger and Malvik 
(2000) on Norway’s cost of implementing the Kyoto target given different emission trading scenarios. 
The three scenarios shown are free trade, EU capping (limited trading), and no trade. The results show 
the cost-saving potential of free trade, where the national cost (abatement cost plus quota cost) is 
reduced by 26% compared to the case of no trade. The cost in the EU capping case is between the two 
other cases, but closer to no trade. Norway might not be able to buy as many quotas as it would choose 
to minimize the national implementation cost of the Kyoto Protocol. Slide 7.4 lists some factors that 
might restrict Norway’s choice in this respect. 
 
The largest cost related to a climate policy for Norway, however, stems from Norway’s role as a large 
exporter of oil and gas. Slide 7.5 is taken from Kolshus et al. (2000) and shows the costs related to a 
reduced oil and gas wealth compared to the abatement cost and quota expenses from Slide 7.3. We see 
that the expected costs from a reduced oil and gas wealth are from 15 to 18 times greater than the 
combined domestic abatement cost and cost from purchasing quotas. 
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Slide 7.3. Quotas and abatement in Norway under the Kyoto Protocol 
Quotas and abatement in Norway 
under the Kyoto Protocol
Source: Kolshus, Torvanger and Malvik (2000)
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Slide 7.4. Potential risks related to large-scale use of the Kyoto mechanisms 
Potential risks related to large-scale 
use of the Kyoto mechanisms
1. The Kyoto Protocol states that use of the mechanisms should be  
supplemental to domestic abatement.
2. Large-scale use of the mechanisms can be difficult for political 
reasons since Norway would be exposed to criticism from many Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Some type of quantitative (or qualitative) restrictions on the use of 
the mechanisms might still be adopted by the Parties.
4. The cost of quotas from the Kyoto mechanisms might be 
underestimated due to large uncertainty and potentially large 
transactions costs, particularly for the CDM.
Source: CICERO.
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Slide 7.5. Total cost for Norway under the Kyoto Protocol 
Total costs for Norway under the 
Kyoto Protocol
Costs (million USD) Free trade EU capping No trade
Quota and abatement 112 146 151
Revenue loss 2,046 2,264 2,418
Total costs 2,158 2,410 2,569
Source: Kolshus, Torvanger and Malvik (2000)
 
 
 
At the domestic level, Norway should as soon as possible develop a long-term climate policy strategy 
where the Kyoto Protocol is the first stage to give industry and other actors a stable long-term policy 
environment and sufficient time for developing their strategies. This must be done well before the first 
Kyoto target year 2008. All Parties to the Kyoto Protocol must demonstrate progress in meeting their 
targets by 2005. Furthermore, given the uncertainty with respect to the future of the Kyoto Protocol, 
Norway should develop a policy for an international climate policy where the Kyoto Protocol does not 
enter into force, for instance as part of a European “Kyoto light” with many participating countries 
from other regions of the world where the EU is in the lead. With regard to this political uncertainty, 
such a climate policy strategy should be flexible and able to handle different climate policy futures. 
The strategy should also be able to handle different technology futures given the vital role of 
technological progress in meeting the climate change challenge and the uncertainty surrounding future 
technologies and their prices. Norway could spend some of its oil money on long-term research and 
development programs for green, energy-efficient and carbon-low or carbon-free technologies, which 
are likely to meet a growing market both domestically and on the world market in the decades to 
come. This could give Norway a competitive edge and move us from oil production to green energy 
production in the future. One obvious possibility is to build on Norway’s competence in marine 
technologies (including our gas- and oil technology on the continental shelf). As part of such a 
strategy, technologies for extracting and storing carbon dioxide in stable geological structures (for 
instance empty oil wells) could be worth exploring, at least as part of a temporary solution in moving 
to a low-carbon energy system in the future.  
 
 
8. Prospects for climate policy and the Kyoto 
Protocol 
8.1 Prospects for the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol 
The uncertainty of the future of the Kyoto Protocol is larger than ever before due to President Bush’s 
decision to withdraw American support and not ratify the Protocol. This is a provocative stance for the 
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EU and a number of other countries that have invested a lot in the Kyoto Protocol. Many countries, 
including Japan, Russia and Canada, have criticized Bush’s decision. This is a serious situation for the 
Protocol. If the Americans stick to this position, there are only two options left for COP6 in July. 
Either the USA must come up with an alternative approach, or those countries supporting 
implementation of the Protocol must move on without the USA. 
 
The first option seems difficult for many reasons. First, a new initiative from the USA would probably 
deviate significantly from the present protocol in terms of targets and the role of developing countries, 
which would raise fierce opposition from many Parties. This would be totally unacceptable to many 
countries because of the resources invested in the Protocol, particularly for the EU. Second, this would 
de facto imply that negotiations must start more or less from scratch. This would be time-consuming 
and take place in a negotiation environment that would be far from supportive of a constructive dialog. 
The Climate Convention, which the USA has ratified, could still serve as a negotiation platform since 
it entered into force in 1994. However, there is a wide gap between the sound principles for long-term 
management of the climate system in the Convention and practical steps and commitments toward 
meeting those principles. 
 
Slide 8.1. Different climate policy futures (Kyoto Protocol=KP) 
Different global climate policy
futures (Kyoto Protocol = KP)
KP enters into 
force without the 
USA
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other countries 
implement a KP 
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are taken by single 
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Slide 8.1 shows the main paths for a climate policy regime that are possible after COP6 bis in July 
2001. The EU, with support from many other countries, may choose to implement the Kyoto Protocol 
without the participation of the USA. Most countries are likely to follow the Europeans in that case. 
The countries that would be most likely to follow the USA would be Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand. Formally, the Protocol could enter into force without the USA if most other countries ratify. 
The Protocol must be ratified by Annex I countries that together represent at least 55% of CO2 
emissions within this group in 1990 (see Slide 8.2 for an overview of the emission shares of the largest 
Annex I countries). However, if the support for the Protocol is too weak to have it enter into force, the 
EU and other collaborating countries may settle for an agreement similar to the Kyoto Protocol within 
this region, where most of the relevant features of the Protocol are kept. In both cases, the USA would 
be a free-rider to abatement efforts of other countries. This would be a difficult starting point for the 
collaborating countries due to USA’s political importance at the global level, and due to the USA 
being the largest emitter of climate gases both in absolute terms and in per capita terms (aside from a 
few small countries). Furthermore, at least in the short term, this could mean a loss of competitive 
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edge for European industries compared to the USA. However, the USA risks being isolated both 
among industrialized countries, and its relations with developing countries could be seriously harmed. 
Since the collaborating countries would have to develop new and energy-efficient energy 
technologies, this could in the longer run give them a competitive edge compared to American 
industries with weaker environmental and climate-policy incentives. The markets for green 
technologies are expected to grow at a fast rate during the next decades, as environmental and climate 
demands increase. Thus the USA might later be forced to follow suit. When American shareholders 
discover that they lose money invested in American companies compared to European companies, 
they will pressure the American administration to change its climate policy. 
 
Slide 8.2. Distribution of CO2 emissions in Annex I in 1990 
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Another possibility is that single countries choose to carry out national climate policy targets whatever 
the choice of (most) other countries. Furthermore, industries covering many countries might choose to 
collaborate and implement a type of environmentally sound business strategy if they expect this to 
give them a valuable green image in the market and in public opinion. Another incentive could be in 
terms of developing green technologies that would be profitable in a relatively short time. For the 
same reasons, large (multinational) companies may choose proactive climate strategies. 
 
Whatever the fate of the Kyoto Protocol we are convinced that a global climate treaty will eventually 
emerge as long as the signs of man-made climate change and following negative impacts for most 
countries become more and more clear. Thus the present dilemma of a stall at the political arena and 
new and stronger evidence of global man-made warming can only be temporary. A main challenge is 
to prevent most countries from becoming so discouraged by the lack of progress in international 
climate agreements that they only focus on adaptation policies, where they receive most of the benefits 
regardless of the policy choice of other countries. Such a scenario could mean a fast-paced climate 
change with many negative consequences, particularly to the detriment of vulnerable developing 
countries, such as low-lying island states that are vulnerable to sea level rise. 
8.2 Prospects for Norway 
As a small open economy, Norway is very dependent on the climate policies and economic policies of 
our main trading partners. Norway will most likely further approach the EU and participate in EU-led 
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climate initiatives if the USA backs out of the climate process. Whatever Norway chooses our oil and 
gas wealth will be reduced as long as a substantive climate policy is carried out at the international 
level. 
8.3 Burden sharing in future climate policy agreements 
A challenging task faced by negotiators in their efforts to develop new climate policy treaties is how to 
divide the burden of abatement between countries in future agreements, especially between 
industrialized countries and developing countries. While the richer countries in the North are 
responsible for the bulk of emissions, the poorer countries in the South are expected to bear the brunt 
of harmful impacts. Moreover, the South has to struggle with how to continue to develop if they take 
on commitments to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases. 
 
Two main burden-sharing principles are the “grandfathering” approach, where abatement targets are 
based on past emissions, and the per capita approach, where national targets are based on each citizen 
receiving an equal entitlement to emissions. Strictly speaking, the grandfathering principle favors the 
North by “rewarding” countries with historically high emissions and “punishing” countries that are in 
the process of development. In contrast, a pure per capita approach would allow developing countries 
to increase their emissions drastically and would require industrialized countries to reduce their 
emissions to a much lower level than today. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol may represent an important political achievement but its expected impact on the 
climate is marginal at best. The agreement is nowhere near sufficient for stabilizing or reducing the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, partly because developing countries have not 
committed to reducing their emissions in this round, and partly because the time horizon so far is only 
until 2012. Future climate negotiations must therefore contain more ambitious targets as well as the 
participation of developing countries. Let us consider some approaches to burden sharing from the 
literature that addresses this challenge. 
 
In an attempt to realize this aim, the Global Commons Institute (GCI) has proposed that emission 
entitlements be allocated on a per capita basis. The basic idea behind the method, called “contraction 
and convergence” (C&C), is that we need a long-term, global agreement on controlling the total 
emission budget of CO2 and on how this budget should be fairly divided between all countries. The 
emission budget will be consistent with a given concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere by 2100. C&C 
defines a formula for allocating future tradable CO2 quotas for all countries based on a gradual 
transition to per capita shares. The parameters can be changed and the results can easily be illustrated 
graphically. Slide 8.3 shows the results based on a global emissions budget that gives a CO2 
concentration that does not exceed a 450 ppmv limit for atmospheric concentration of CO2. A 450 
ppmv limit for atmospheric CO2 concentration is at the very lower end of SRES scenarios from TAR. 
The allocated emission quotas per capita to each country are to become identical over time, to 
converge. In this case, the convergence year is set to year 2050. Until that time, the developed 
countries’ allocated emission quotas will be reduced gradually. It is clear that the emissions of CO2 in 
1990 were at a good 6 gigatons (GtC), while the peak of about 9 GtC is projected to be reached around 
2015. For atmospheric concentrations not to exceed 450 ppmv, the industrialized countries must 
reduce their emissions significantly. It is also clear that developing countries will increase their 
emissions and become responsible for a much higher share of the global emissions in, e.g., 2070 than 
in 2000. 
 
Bartsch and Müller (2000), in a study of implications of the Kyoto Protocol for the global oil market, 
develop a burden-sharing method for future climate policy treaties based on a mix of the 
grandfathering and the per capita rules. Each citizen is given one vote for one of these principles and is 
assumed to vote for the principle that results in the most emission quotas for his/her country. When the 
votes are summed up over nations on a global scale and the two principles weighted according to the 
number of votes, the authors find that the per capita weight is 0.75 and the grandfathering weight is 
0.25. Consequently, developing countries would be given an enormous number of climate gas quotas 
that they would be able to sell to industrialized countries. This would lead to a large transfer of money 
from North to South. 
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Slide 8.3 Past/allocated CO2 emissions from 1860 to 2200 
Past/allocated CO2 emissions
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While the burden sharing in the Kyoto Protocol to a large extent is based on past emissions (1990), the 
actual targets are the outcome of negotiations where both the Parties’ different willingness to take on 
commitments and specific national circumstances played a role. It is now becoming clear that in the 
long run a more systematic approach to the issue of burden sharing will be imperative. In a joint 
project with the Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), CICERO has recently concluded a 
project that explores issues of burden sharing. The specific objective of this project was to develop a 
useful tool for negotiators in the next round of climate policy negotiations, that is, for agreeing on 
reduction commitments after the Kyoto Protocol period ending in 2012. After exploring relevant 
fairness principles, burden-sharing rules, and availability of data, a multi-sector convergence approach 
is developed. This approach is based on the per capita principle, but rather than first setting overall per 
capita based national targets, it sets standards on a sector basis and adjusts them over time so that per 
capita emissions in each sector become more alike on an international basis. Seven economic sectors 
are specified: power production, households, transportation, industry and manufacturing, service, 
agriculture, and waste. Each sector is allocated a non-binding emission target in per capita terms. For 
the base year 2010, a global sector emission standard is set equal to the world average per capita 
emissions of that sector. Thereafter an annual percentage reduction norm per sector is set so that all 
countries converge to the same national per capita emission level in some year, e.g. 2100. Some 
implications of the approach are found from calculating national costs for the second budget period 
(2013–17) for all industrialized countries. The results show that this approach can serve as a sound 
basis for facilitating future policy negotiations on differentiating emission limitation targets among a 
large variety of countries. 
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